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ABSTRACT 
Peace at home, peace in the world. 
 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk 
The founder and the first president of the Turkish Republic 
 
This thesis examines the potential of the two competing designs for the Littoral 
Combat Ship (LCS), with regard to potential deployment of this vessel type by the 
Turkish Navy. The first design is by Lockheed Martin and has been designated the USS 
Freedom as the U.S. Navy’s first LCS. The second design is by General Dynamics. This 
thesis focuses on the LCS usage concepts in Naval Capability Pillars and Information 
Operations. 
As a transformation platform, the LCS will be critical in implementing new 
operational concepts and in providing a focused, littoral mission platform for joint forces. 
Its superior speed and maneuverability; low radar, infrared, and acoustic signatures; and 
ability to lay distributed sensor fields are all fundamental to mission success. It will also 
carry a “squadron” of unmanned vehicles (air, surface, and undersea) that will 
considerably extend its sensor and weapon coverage and provide substantial Anti-
Submarine Warfare (ASW) capabilities. 
This thesis also discusses present and future platforms and their concepts of 
operation in Turkish littoral waters (Aegean Sea, Black Sea, and Mediterranean Sea).  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
According to U.S. Navy guidelines, the U.S. Navy is required to project power 
from the sea and maintain consistent access in the littoral regions, which for naval vessels 
refers specifically to the transition areas between open ocean and more constricted 
shallower waters close to shore—the littorals. “Anti-access” threats from mines, 
submarines, and surface forces threaten the U.S. Navy’s ability to assure access to the 
littorals.  
The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is being developed to address these concerns. 
The LCS design concept consists of two distinct parts, the ship itself and the mission 
package it carries and deploys. For the LCS, the ship is referred to as the “seaframe” and 
consists of the hull, command and control systems, launch and recovery systems, and 
certain core systems like radar and gun. A core crew will be responsible for the 
seaframe’s basic functions. Operating with these systems alone offers some capability to 
perform general or ordinary missions, such as support of special operations forces or 
maritime intercept operations.  
The LCS’s focused missions are mine warfare, anti-submarine warfare, and 
surface warfare. The majority of the capabilities for these missions will come from 
mission packages. These packages are intended to be modular in that they will be 
interchangeable on the seaframe. Each mission package consists of systems made up of 
manned and unmanned vehicles and the subsystems these vehicles use in their missions. 
Additional crew will be needed to operate these systems. Each mission package is 
envisioned as being self-contained and interchangeable and will allow tailoring of LCS to 
meet specific threats. 
The U.S. Navy characterizes the schedule for acquisition and deployment of the 
LCS as aggressive. To meet this schedule, the U.S. Navy is pursuing an evolutionary 
acquisition strategy. Rather than initially delivering a full capability, the program is 
structured to deliver incremental capabilities to the warfighter. To support this, LCS 
acquisition will be broken into “flights” for the seaframe and “spirals” for mission 
  xvi 
packages in order to develop improvements while fielding technologies as they become 
available. The initial flight of ships, referred to as Flight 0, will serve two main purposes: 
provide a limited operational capability, and provide input to the Flight 1 design through 
experimentation with operations and mission packages. Flight 1 will provide more 
complete capabilities but is not intended to serve as the sole design for the more than 50 
LCS the U.S. Navy ultimately plans to buy. 
The U.S. Navy and Lockheed Martin signed a contract for detailed design and 
construction of the first Flight 0 ship in December 2004, and the ship builder is expected 
to deliver the ship to the U.S. Navy in fiscal year 2007. The U.S. Navy will then begin 
testing and experimenting with the ship, using the first mission package—mine warfare. 
A date for any deployment with the fleet has not been determined.  
Detailed design and construction for the first General Dynamics design ship is 
scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2006 and delivery is scheduled for fiscal year 2008. The 
delivery of the first anti-submarine and surface warfare mission packages is aligned with 
the delivery of the second Flight 0 ship. The U.S. Navy will choose designs for further 




Small network combatants have an important role to play in 21st century 
naval warfare, and the reconfigurable Littoral Combat Ship may make 
important warfighting contributions as part of the Navy’s 21st century 
“Total Force Battle Network” (TFBN).1   
Robert O. Work 
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 
 
A. AREA OF RESEARCH 
This thesis examines the potential of the two competing designs for the Littoral 
Combat Ship (LCS). The first design is by Lockheed Martin and has been designated the 
USS Freedom as the U.S. Navy’s first LCS. The second design is by General Dynamics. 
This thesis focuses on the LCS usage concepts in Naval Capability Pillars and 
Information Operations. 
As a transformation platform, the LCS will be critical in implementing new 
operational concepts and in providing a focused, littoral mission platform for joint forces. 
Its superior speed and maneuverability; low radar, infrared, and acoustic signatures; and 
ability to lay distributed sensor fields are all fundamental to mission success. It will also 
carry a “squadron” of unmanned vehicles (air, surface, and undersea) that will 
considerably extend its sensor and weapon coverage providing substantial Anti-
Submarine Warfare (ASW) capabilities. 
This thesis also discusses present and future platforms and their concepts of 
operation in Turkish littoral waters (Aegean Sea, Black Sea, and Mediterranean Sea).  
Ships intended to fight in the relatively cluttered environment of the littorals 
should be small, nimble, lightly manned, and expendable.  The intent is to swarm over an 
adversary. 
 
                                                 
1 Work and Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington D.C., 2004. 
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This thesis will be used as an initial starting point for the LCS’s test and 
evaluation process. The results from this thesis will be used to determine critical 
operational issues, measures of performance and effectiveness, and objectives to support 
operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) of the LCS. 
Further research will assist the Turkish Navy in evaluating future needs and 
requirements within the littoral combat environment.     
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
• What defines a Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)? 
• Development process 
• Main designs 
• What are the LCS operational concepts in the Naval Capability Pillars 
(NCPs)? 
• Sea shield 
• Sea strike 
• Sea base 
• ForceNet 
• How will the LCS implement these new operational concepts and provide 
a focused littoral mission platform for joint forces?  
• What assets are other countries using for littoral combat? 
• What are the electronic warfare (EW) capabilities of the LCS? 
• How does the Turkish Navy conduct littoral combat? 
• Status of the Aegean Sea 
• Black Sea 
• Mediterranean Sea  
• To what degree, if any, can the LCS effectively become an asset to the 
Turkish Navy for littoral combat? 
• Joint operations  
• Modular design  






LCS is envisioned to be a fast, agile, stealthy, relatively small, and 
affordable surface combatant. Its warfighting capabilities should be 
optimized for versatility in the littorals for anti-access and ‘gapfiller’ 
missions against asymmetric threats. A defining characteristic should be 
extensive reliance on a variety of organic unmanned vehicles. The ship 
should leverage transformational weapons, sensors, data fusion, C4ISR, 
materials, hull design, propulsion, ‘smart’ control systems, optimal 
manning concepts, and self-defense systems to enable it to survive and 
thrive in an adverse littoral environment.2 
On November 1, 2001, the U.S. Navy announced that it would issue a revised 
request for proposal (RFP) for its future surface combatant program. Formerly known as 
DD-21 (for 21st Century Destroyer), the new program would be known as the DD(X), a 
large multi-mission destroyer from which the family took its name; the CG(X), a large 
multi-mission guided missile cruiser; and a LCS, small “focused mission” ship. For the 
next several decades, these three new “advanced technology surface combatants” would 
operate alongside a large “legacy” force of over 80 multi-mission combatants designed 
during the Cold War for open-ocean warfare against the Soviet Navy. 
 
Missions LCS DD(X) CG(X) 
ASW Yes Yes Yes 
ASuW No Yes Yes 
AAW Yes Yes Yes 
Ship Interceptions No Yes Yes 















Aviation Yes Yes Yes 
ASV Yes No No 
ASuW   Yes3 Yes Yes 


















MW Yes No No 
                                                 
2 Commander Naval Surface Forces Pacific, 2002. 
3 The LCS will conduct ASuW operations against small surface craft.  
  4
Missions LCS DD(X) CG(X) 
Coastal Suppression  Yes No No 
Embarked Force Yes No No 
Logistic support Yes Yes Yes 
Aviation (inc. UAVs) Yes Yes Yes 
Table 1.   Capabilities of U.S. Future Surface Combatants. 
 
The LCS will be a “Network-Centric,” Advanced Technology Ship. The LCS will 
rely heavily on manned and unmanned vehicles to execute assigned missions and operate 
as part of a netted, distributed force. In order to conduct successful combat operations in 
an adverse littoral environment, the LCS will employ technologically advanced weapons, 
sensors, data fusion, command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), hullform, propulsion, optimal manning 
concepts, smart control systems, and self-defense systems. 
According to Captain Donald Bancock, U.S. Navy, the LCS Naval Sea Systems 
Command (NAVSEA) Program Manager, the development and employment the LCS is 
like playing with LEGO’s®. The core will be standing by to receive additional blocks 
(modules). The actual mission modules will be delivered in standard-sized cargo 
containers. These containers are lowered through a door in the flight deck into the 
mission module area. The reconfigurable mission systems interface control document for 
the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) for Detail Design Phase states: 
The LCS platform shall be designed to accommodate multiple 
reconfigurable modular mission packages to accomplish focused missions 
via an open and modular design that provides flexibility and ease of 
upgrade while ensuring rapid and successful installation and integration of 
the mission packages to the platform. To permit use of a wide range of 
both present and future mission systems and to permit platform and 
mission systems to be developed independently, standard interfaces in the 
form of a standard technical architecture must be used. Industry shall 






architecture for mission systems based on this standard technical 
architecture. Separately, mission modules will be developed for the LCS 
based on this technical architecture.4 
With consideration to the above discussion, this thesis will focus on the 
evaluation of the LCS as a potential asset for the Turkish Navy. The Turkish Navy 
currently uses Burak (Type A 69), Barbaros, Yavuz, Gabya (Perry), Tepe (Knox) class 
frigates and Kilic, Kartal, Dogan, Ruzgar, Yildiz class Guided Missile-Fast Attack craft 
for littoral combat operations. This thesis will include comparisons between these 
platforms, the LCS, and other types of littoral combat assets.  
Another aspect of the thesis will be an examination of the different design 
capabilities of the LCS with respect to littoral combat operations. Mine Warfare (MW), 
Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), and electronic Warfare (EW) will be examined with 
regard to their critical roles in littoral combat.        
D. ROADMAP OF THE THESIS: A CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Figure 1 shows the outline of the thesis. 
 
Figure 1.   Roadmap of the Thesis 
 
                                                 
4 Bromley and Naval Postgraduate School, U.S., 2005. 
Introduction LCS Overview 
Littoral Combat Assets 





























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
  7
II. LITTORAL COMBAT CONCEPTS  
A good gun causes victory, armor only postpones defeat. 
 
Vice Admiral S. O. Makarov 
 
A. LITTORAL COMBAT 
Naval operations near land are best described as warfare in confined waters. 
Coastal waters off an enemy’s homeland are not only where the enemy will test a navy’s 
control, but also where he has the advantages of congestion and limited battle space. 
Warships which operate in this complex environment will have their warning and 
reaction times significantly reduced and their ability to maneuver will be compromised 
by virtue of the shallow water and the always present mine threat. Additionally, 
classification and deconfliction are crucial given the abundance of aircraft and shipping 
in this environment.5 More than 70% of the earth’s population resides within a few 
hundred miles of the world’s coastlines, near waterways teeming with merchant ships. 
The littoral —or coastal— waters of the world can be choked with mines, blocked 
by submarines, or subject to raids by small, armed boats. These are threats that cannot be 
ignored, avoided, or bypassed. The littoral as defined by U.S. DoD does not refer only to 
waters close in to shore, but can mean an area several hundred miles out to sea. Some of 
the dangers in the littoral are unsophisticated in nature, such as contact mines or suicide 
boats. Others are more complex, such as air independent propulsion (AIP) submarines 
armed with supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles or long-range, high-speed torpedoes. 
These threats can limit access, impede an invasion force, interdict a logistics effort, and 
damage capital ships. 
1. Littoral Environment 
What constitutes the littoral region currently has no standardized definition; the 
ranges included in the different definitions differ widely. In general, however, it is agreed 
that in the littoral environment the advantage goes to the defending forces. It will be 
                                                 
5 Wade Hughes and Kemple, 1996. 
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complex and congested, with potential threats dispersed amongst a large number of 
civilian aircraft, ships, and real estate. It will include areas of deep and shallow water and 
the latter with its poor acoustic environment will favor the use of submarines and mines 
by an enemy. The proximity of hostile airfields and ports can also allow a large number 
of sorties to be made against an approaching expeditionary force. 
One of the most noticeable differences in the various definitions in littoral warfare 
is the difference in the definition of ranges in the littoral battlespace. Those used by the 
U.S. can be twice those used by its NATO Allies. This difference has two main causes: 
one, the use of carrier based airpower by the U.S., and two, that most European concepts 
of force employment in the littoral are based on Baltic or Mediterranean scenarios.6 
U.S. Naval Doctrine Publication I, “Naval Warfare,” defines “littoral” as “those 
regions relating to or existing on a shore or coastal region, within direct control of and 
vulnerable to the power of naval expeditionary forces.”7 The U.S. Navy further describes 
littoral warfare as.”..the ability to mass overwhelming joint and allied force and deliver it 
ashore to influence, deter, contain and overcome the enemy.”8 
In the United Kingdom (U.K.), the littoral region is defined in publication JWP 0-
01.19 as “coastal sea areas and that portion of the land that is susceptible to influence or 
support from the sea.” “Coastal sea areas” traditionally imply ranges such that naval 
forces can be deployed over the horizon, where they cannot be detected visually or by 
conventional land-based radar, but not necessarily any further than that. This definition 
also does not fully take into account the development of long-range standoff weapon 
systems such as Tomahawk and Storm Shadow. 
Although it is possible to influence events on land by projecting power over 
littoral waters and thus avoid the need to operate in them, eventually logistic support 
from the sea will be required to sustain land forces. Also, if required, amphibious forces 
                                                 
6 Royal Institution of Naval Architects, 2004. 
7 U.S. Department of the Navy, 1994. 
8 Anonymous, 1994. 
9 MoD, 2001. 
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must transit through littoral waters to conduct a landing. Even in operations with limited 
objectives or operations other than war, such as low intensity conflicts, noncombatant 
evacuation operations (NEO), peacekeeping, and showing the flag operations, the naval 
role is to exert influence near land with a constant and visible presence. At some point, 
naval forces must operate within the littoral.10 
The extreme littorals can be described as follows: 
• Complex environment – Shallow waters, archipelago, temperature and 
salinity layers makes hiding easy and detection difficult. 
• Heavy sea traffic – ferries, merchant ships, fishing and pleasure boats. 
• A broad spectrum of threats – Anti-ship Missiles, Mines, Torpedoes, 
Artillery, Swimmers, Small units. 
• Short distances – Lack of space for defense in depth and for maneuvering. 
• Short reaction times.11 
With an average water depth of 60-65 m, the Turkish Navy’s areas of 
responsibility, the Aegean Sea, the Sea of Marmara (Figure 2), the Mediterranean Sea 
(Figure 4), and the Black Sea (Figure 3) are certainly examples of a littoral environment.    
 
 
                                                 
10 Wade Hughes and Kemple, 1996. 
11 Royal Institution of Naval Architects, 2004. 
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Figure 2.   The Aegean Sea and The Sea of Marmara12  
 
 
Figure 3.   The Black Sea13  
 
                                                 
12 NASA, 2006. 
13 NASA, 2006. 
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Figure 4.   The East Mediterranean Sea14  
 
2. Littoral Operations 
To win on this 21st Century battlefield, the U.S. Navy must be able to 
dominate the littorals, being out and about, ready to strike on a moments 
notice, anywhere, anytime, without a permission slip. 
Admiral Vernon E. Clark 
Chief of Naval Operations     
 
The focus of naval operations has moved away from the cold war blue-water fleet 
actions towards low- and medium-intensity operations in the littoral regions within a joint 
integrated battlespace, as has been demonstrated in recent conflicts. The concept of 
employing naval forces in the littoral, though, is not new and is defined by both offensive 
and defensive requirements. The offensive requirement is primarily driven by the 
demands of expeditionary warfare and the need to position forces (either joint or 
coalition) into a position of advantage from which force can be rapidly applied ashore. 
The defensive requirement, however, is quite different and primarily revolves around the 
                                                 
14 NASA, 2006. 
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many facets of homeland security. Therefore, the requirements of each individual navy 
concerning littoral warfare will be determined by their individual balance between 
homeland security and expeditionary warfare.15 
Over three-quarters of the world’s population and over 80 percent of all capital 
cities are found within 200 nm of the coast, and nearly all the international trade takes 
place in this littoral region. The littoral waters are not only critical for any potential 
adversary; they are also target-rich environments for terrorists. The littoral is a complex 
operating environment. These waters are usually congested and shallow with difficult 
acoustic and atmospheric conditions. Significant numbers of friendly and neutral ships 
and aircraft are to be found in the littoral waters. The above characteristics invite threats 
such as mines, diesel submarines, fast attack craft/fast inshore attack craft, anti-ship 
cruise missiles, and aircraft to deny access for naval forces, friends, and partners.16 
Traditionally, deepwater naval fleets were developed so that they could carry out 
the deep water role along with homeland defense. Many of the items of equipment aboard 
the vessels were purposefully tailored to improve their performance in the area of 
homeland defense. However, with the change to littoral operations, different priorities 
have been established and these multi-role vessels are no longer ideally suited to their 
emerging operational roles. The ship operations that are required in the relevant 
battlespaces are summarized in Table 2. 
 
Littoral Warfare OperationsShip Missions Deep Water 
Operations Homeland Expeditionary 
Anti-submarine Warfare Required Required Required 
Organic Possible Required Required Mine Counter 
Measures Wide Area Not Required Not Required Required 
DD/FF Required Possible Required Anti-Surface 
Warfare FICA/PSB Not Required Required Required 
                                                 
15 Royal Institution of Naval Architects, 2004. 
16 Jundquist, 2005. 
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Littoral Warfare OperationsShip Missions Deep Water 
Operations Homeland Expeditionary 
Point (self) Required Possible Required Anti-Air 
Warfare Local Required Not Required Required 
Ship Interceptions Possible Required Not Required 
Coastal Suppression Not Required Not Required Required 
Embarked Force Not Required Required Required 
Logistic Support Required Not Required Possible 
Aviation (inc. UAVs) Required Possible Required 
Table 2.   Ship Operations by Battlespace Region17 
 
While operating in open waters, warships count on the inherent difficulties in 
scouting such vast areas to conceal their positions. Most countries lack the 
reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities to detect and localize naval forces far out at 
sea. This change, however, if naval forces move closer to an enemy’s coast to conduct 
littoral sea control, protect friendly or neutral merchant shipping, or bring targets ashore 
within range of power projection. Having to fight in the enemy’s neighborhood can offset 
advantages in training and equipment as it drastically simplifies enemy scouting, 
logistics, force concealment, and weapon range problems.  
Table 13 details some of the possible threats that platforms may encounter in 
either the deep water or the littoral battlespace. The accepted standard for littoral threats 
is that the enemy knows his local waters better than anyone else. If tactically smart, he 
can use the region’s geography and modern communications to ambush naval forces in 
transit or when otherwise vulnerable. Imagine that an adversary distributes “spotters” on 
board merchant ships or fishing boats throughout his maritime neighborhood. These 
scouts detect a strike group at tactically significant distances and report in via satellite 
phones or other secure means. Despite the enemy's inability to conduct a long-range 
strike or maintain a near-real-time, over-the-horizon picture, they position assets to lay an 
ambush along the strike group’s most likely track. Despite the employment of emissions 
                                                 
17 Royal Institution of Naval Architects, 2004. 
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control and operational deception by a strike group that is entering an area, the scouts 
report its location since it cannot hide in such confined waters. The enemy saturates the 
formation with anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) fired by fast patrol boats hiding amid 
dense, regional shipping and from concealed positions that take advantage of coastal 
topography. Even with the formation’s advanced air-defense systems, the laws of 
probability suggest that some missiles will get through. If final active and passive, 
electronic defenses or hard-kill, close-in defenses fail to neutralize the threat, warships 
will take hits. Fast guided-missile patrol boats and basic ASCMs are relatively 
inexpensive and easy to field; a missile does not need to be complex if enough are fired 
such that a formation's surface-to-air missile (SAM) inventories are depleted or their 
capabilities overwhelmed. The more threat axes the enemy fires from, the more difficult 









Aircraft Attack—ASM Yes Yes 
Aircraft Attack—Bombs Yes Yes 
Ship-Based Helicopter—ASM Yes Yes 
Land-Based Helicopter—ASM No Yes 
Long-Ranged, Land-Based UAV Yes Yes 
Short-Ranged, Ship-Based UAV Yes Yes 
Short-Ranged, Land-Based UAV No Yes 
Ship Launched ASM Yes Yes 
Surface Ship Gunfire Yes Yes 
Submarine Launched ASM Yes Yes 
Submarine Launched Torpedo Yes Yes 
Nuclear Threat Yes Yes 
Chemical Threat No Yes 
Biological Threat No Yes 
Mines No Yes 
                                                 









FAC No Yes 
FIAC No Yes 
Manned Surface Explosive Craft No Yes 
USV No Yes 
Mini Submarines No Yes 
Manned Torpedoes No Yes 
UUV No Yes 
Land Based Gunfire No Yes 
Land Based ASM No Yes 
Table 3.   Threats to a Naval Platform19 
 
The proliferation of sophisticated ASCMs threatens warships’ ability to operate 
and survive in the littoral. The threat to surface ships from sophisticated anti-ship missiles 
is increasing. Nearly 70 nations have deployed sea- and land-launched cruise missiles, 
and 20 nations have deployed air-launched cruise missiles. There are over 100 existing 
and projected missile varieties with ranges up to about 185 miles. The next generation of 
anti-ship cruise missiles—some of which are now expected to be fielded by 2007—will 
be equipped with advanced target seekers and stealth design. These features will make 
them even more difficult to detect and defeat.20  
The same is true with regard to torpedo defense, especially with the limitations on 
evasive maneuvering in confined waters, challenges in detection, and the lack of anti-
torpedo, hard-kill capability. For the enemy’s bottomed or hovering submarines fire 
wake-homing torpedoes into the formation, all they have to do is sit and wait for the 
formation to steam over them. Prior to the ambush, the submarines could also deploy 
minefields that are optimized with their knowledge of the bottom topography, so that the  
 
 
                                                 
19 Royal Institution of Naval Architects, 2004. 
20 United States General Accounting Office, 2001. 
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torpedo and missile attacks herd the force into another trap. Combat generally favors the 
side that most innovatively employs existing platforms and weapons, fires first, and fires 
effectively and in mass using the least complex plans.21 
The primary goal of anti-submarine warfare is to deny the enemy effective use of 
its submarines against navy ships. Naval forces use antisubmarine sensors and weapons 
on their surface ships, submarines, and aircraft, along with fixed and deployable acoustic 
and non-acoustic sensors to detect, track, and destroy enemy submarines. Figure 5 
illustrates antisubmarine warfare functions. 
 
 
Figure 5.   Techniques Used in Littoral Regions to Detect and Locate a Diesel 
Submarine22  
 
Another significant littoral threat as noted above is sea mines. Enemy sea mines 
have been responsible for 14 of the 19 U.S. Navy ships destroyed or damaged since 1950. 
Some countries are continuing to develop and proliferate mines that are increasingly 
more difficult to detect and neutralize. To appreciate the complexity of the mine 
                                                 
21 Hughes and Hughes, 2000. 
22 United States General Accounting Office, 2001. 
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countermeasures warfare task, it is important to understand the environment in which 
mine warfare operations take place. Figure 6 illustrates the five water depths of the 
undersea battlespace and the types of mines found at each depth.  
Recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan point to the need for persistent 
presence, assured access, long-range strike and a robust, naval surface fire support. 
Coalition mine warfare forces located and destroyed numerous mines and mine-like 
objects before humanitarian supplies could proceed into Iraqi ports. The fact that almost a 
dozen actual mines were located and destroyed is indicative of the reality of the mine 
threat in littoral waters and their tremendous impact on operations. Once cleared of the 
mine threat, the U.K. Royal Navy surface combatants were able to position themselves to 
deliver naval fire to surface targets on the Al Faw Peninsula in Southern Iraq. The U.S. 
Navy units did not have the shallow draft to participate in delivering these fires, but 
would have been able to participate if longer-range precision fires were available. But, 
the U.S. Coast Guard’s assets—key elements of the Navy-Coast Guard “National Fleet” 
concept—did indeed work in areas that otherwise constrained larger warships.23 
 
 
Figure 6.   Sea Mine Threats by Water Depth24  
 
                                                 
23 Lundquist, 2004. 
24 United States General Accounting Office, 2001. 
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During the Gulf War, two Navy ships—the USS Princeton and the USS Tripoli— 
were severely damaged and seven sailors injured by sea mines. Figure 7 shows the 
damage 10 feet below the waterline on the USS Tripoli. The USS Tripoli was damaged 
by an Iraqi sea mine in the Persian Gulf on February 18, 1991.  
 
 
Figure 7.   Sea Mine Damage to the USS Tripoli in the Gulf War25  
 
The U.S. Marine Corps’ future war-fighting concept for littoral operations will 
stress speed, maneuverability, and avoidance of enemy strong points to achieve military 
objectives. This concept assumes that amphibious assaults will be launched from at least 
25 nautical miles from shore to enhance surprise and the survivability of the fleet and 
invading forces. According to the Marine Corps, operating at this distance from shore and 
the need to neutralize enemy artillery at its maximum range results in a near-term 
requirement for naval gunfire support from 41 to 63 nautical miles to support amphibious 
assault landings and combat operations ashore. However, the Marine Corps expects to 
conduct operations farther inland in the future and has revised the required range for 
future ship-based fire support to 200 nautical miles. Figure 8 illustrates the naval surface 
fire support operations. 
                                                 
25 United States General Accounting Office, 2001. 
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Figure 8.   Naval Surface Fire Support Operations26  
 
The nature of expeditionary operations involves moving troops and material 
ashore. While expeditionary forces may have the ability to fly over a contested beachhead 
and operate far inland, access along the littoral is still a strategic, operational, and tactical 
imperative. Sea-based expeditionary forces can be deployed to virtually anywhere in the 
world on short notice because the preponderance of their equipment, vehicles, 
ammunition and fuel are pre-positioned forward aboard ships, awaiting the call to head 
into theater and deliver the cargo to the troops. Large, forward-deployed logistics ships at 
locations such as Diego Garcia or in the Mediterranean Sea may be loaded with vehicles 
for the Marines, fuel for the Army, or bombs for the Air Force. Several ships together 
                                                 
26 United States General Accounting Office, 2001. 
  20
may constitute the equipment for a brigade or a division. The successful deployment of 
these ships into the port closest to where the expeditionary forces are being inserted is an 
operational imperative. 
A good example of this concept in action is the recent deployment of the U.S. 
Army 101st Airborne during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Large, medium-speed roll-
on/roll-off ships (LMSRs) from preloaded military sealift command and other fast sealift 
ships transported more than three million square feet of equipment that met the troops in 
the theater.  
To operate effectively in the littoral, naval forces must be able to handle the 
inherent difficulties of this environment. Captain Wayne P. Hughes Jr., USN (Retired), 
author of Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, has characterized warfare in the littoral as 
“…warfare in confined and congested waters. In this arena, the enemy will not only 
contest our control, but will also use to his advantage the limited battlespace and 
congestion found in this environment.”27 
Compared to the vastness of open ocean operations, the littoral areas are confined 
by geographical constraints that significantly reduce the size of the battlespace and 
increase the vulnerability of units operating within them. The very nature of the waters in 
this type of environment—often narrow, shallow, and bound by the shoreline creates 
unique challenges that lead to interesting insights. CDR John Stavridis, USN, former 
commanding officer of USS Barry (DDG 52), recently noted in a forum on naval tactics 
for small wars that operations in the littoral significantly reduce a ship’s ability to 
maneuver—an extremely uncomfortable operating environment for a commanding 
officer. In his account, CDR Stavridis discusses the operations that he and the USS Barry 
have been involved in the last two years. They have been in Haiti, the Adriatic and the 
Arabian Gulf. The ship routinely operated in waters as shallow as 50 feet with a 
navigational draft of 36 feet. The risk of grounding was therefore a serious concern.  
 
 
                                                 
27 Hughes and Hughes, 2000. 
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Highly competent and vigilant watch teams, both on the bridge and combat information 
center (CIC), were necessitated at all times, which was a significant energy drain upon 
personnel. 
Detection and rapid engagement of suspected threats, however, are by no means 
easy tasks. First, sensors and guidance systems are affected by heavy land clutter, which 
results in severely degraded detection and tracking capabilities. Often false targets are 
created and, potentially worse, actual targets are masked. Second, and perhaps more 
important, the intrinsic density, clutter, and congestion within the littoral environment—
tankers, freighters, fishing boats, and aircraft—result in uncertainties in identification and 
deconfliction. Time is therefore required to develop an accurate tactical picture before 
one can engage the enemy or the incoming threat. Unfortunately, time is a scarce 
commodity when it comes to self-defense in this arena.28 
Rear Admiral Yedidia Ya’ari, Israeli Navy, discusses an anti-surface missile 
scenario in his essay, “The Littoral Arena: A Word of Caution.” The scenario serves well 
to put in perspective the time constraints and ambiguities of a surface missile attack in 
coastal waters. He describes the use of the Russian SS-N-22, a Mach 2-plus sea-skimmer 
missile, against a surface target 15 miles offshore. It is assumed that the ship is constantly 
tracked by coastal radar, and that the ship is unaware of when it has been targeted. The 
missile is launched and will impact the ship within 40 seconds. In order to react 
effectively, the ship “… must be ready not only to detect it [the missile] the instant it is 
launched but to have every countermeasure operating within the first thirty seconds. 
Setting aside the first five or ten seconds for resolving ambiguity in identification, the 
reaction time is reduced to some twenty seconds.” 
Rules of engagement (ROE) thus tend to dominate the minds of the commanding 
officer and tactical action officers because of the need to respond quickly to threats. 
Incidents involving the USS Stark and the USS Vincennes have emphasized this issue. 
Failure to resolve uncertainty and a hesitation to react on the part of a ship may lead to a 
missile hit. On the other hand, quick and rapid reaction to what appears to be a threat may 
                                                 
28 Wade Hughes and Kemple, 1996. 
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lead to undesirable consequences. In order to avoid such incidents and possibly limit the 
escalation of conflicts, there has been an increased emphasis on restrictive control over 
commanding officers with regard to ROE. Often, the commanding officer is given rigid 
constraints on how and when to use weapons, which serves to seriously limit the ability 
of the ship to defend itself until it may be ultimately too late. 
Another challenge in conducting operations in the littoral concerns human factors. 
People play a crucial role in operating the systems required to counter the inherent threat. 
It is by no means realistic to assume that shipboard personnel can continuously perform 
in a state of alertness for extended periods of time, especially with the knowledge that a 
mistake or malfunction of equipment could well result in the disablement or loss of the 
platform. Additionally, it is not possible to take down systems to conduct preventive 
maintenance on vital equipment, because this could degrade weapon and sensor 
performance. Obviously, the stress on shipboard personnel and the eventual degradation 
of equipment make naval forces more vulnerable to attacks in the long run.29 
3. Littoral Navy 
A coastal country can be defined as a country that is located along the sea, but is 
without the ability to establish sea control outside its local waters. This country can, 
however, control its local waters quite effectively.30 
Some general characteristics are shared by most such navies. First, coastal navies 
are prepared and trained exclusively for operations within the littoral environment. They 
understand and are fully acquainted with the geography and conditions of their local 
waters, which serve well to offer cover and protection to their forces. Second, since these 
coastal navies intend to operate in and control these waters, their weapon and sensor 
systems are optimized to operate without degradation in a near-land environment. Third, 
the ships and patrol craft of a coastal navy are relatively small and expendable. The 
proliferation of advanced missile technology allows the concentration of significant 
amounts of firepower on small platforms. These ships are designed for local operations 
and not long-distance operations. Lastly, these navies optimize their doctrine, tactics and 
                                                 
29 Wade Hughes and Kemple, 1996. 
30 Borrensen, 1994. 
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coordination to gain comparative advantages over forces not acquainted with their waters 
or the surrounding environment. This is particularly true when the coastal country can 
pick the time and place for engagement.31 
The primary functions of the navies of these coastal countries can be broken down 
into three elements: protection against the illegal exploitation of natural resources within 
exclusive economic zones; a show of sovereignty and control over territorial waters; and, 
deterrence against invasion from the sea. In order to support these functions, the coastal 
country will most likely utilize a balanced approach with regard to its naval forces. Using 
this concept, a mixture of elements of the coastal defense system—surface, subsurface, 
air, and mine threats—are used to provide both a synchronized defense and a formidable 
offensive capability. 
Synchronized defense is the ability to operate fast patrol boats and submarines 
within weapons range of each other, as well as inside the range of coastal artillery, land- 
based anti-ship missiles, mines, and attack aircraft. This complex operating environment 
forces the opponent to operate in one of two ways. One option is to perform all tasks 
simultaneously—ASUW, AAW, ASW, mine-clearance, etc. The other is to employ 
enough platforms that he can lose some and still fulfill all mission requirements one at a 
time. 
Most countries realize, however, that in an open conflict or all-out war against a 
strong opponent with the will to carry on, they cannot guarantee victory. They could 
perhaps win some battles and cause damage to the opposing force, but they would not be 
able to sustain themselves in the long run. Coastal countries will therefore most likely 
conduct operations which aim to “... bleed the enemy's military and political resources, 
until he comes to the conclusion that the price of continuing the war exceeds any gain he 
might hope to reap from it.” In other words it might be in the coastal country’s interests 
to prolong the conflict to mount political pressure against such a conflict on the enemy’s 
home front.32  
                                                 
31 Wade Hughes and Kemple, 1996. 
32 Borrensen, 1994. 
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As can be seen from the characteristics mentioned, the Turkish Navy has all of the 
characteristics of a coastal navy. 
B. PLATFORMS USED BY THE TURKISH NAVY FOR LITTORAL 
COMBAT 
In light of Turkey’s membership in NATO, the role of the navy during the Cold 
War was to ensure the security of the Black Sea against Warsaw Pact states and to 
operate in the Mediterranean Sea to counter perceived threats in that region. Since the 
demise of the Soviet Union, the Turkish Navy has changed its thinking and adopted an 
expansion policy, venturing on “show the flag” missions.  
The role of the Turkish Navy Forces Command (TNFC), as outlined by the 1998 
White Paper of the Turkish Ministry of National Defense (MND), is to defend the 
country against threats from the sea and to provide security for shipping lanes. The 
change in the TNFC's new strategy that includes the high seas is defined in the White 
Paper as: The regional geography of Turkey and the security requirements of the shipping 
lanes make it necessary in the development of the Turkish Naval Force to combine 
defensive littoral warfare and open seas operations aimed at the control of the open seas. 
With the planned military investments, the Turkish naval force will be transformed from 
a force structure that is intended for littoral warfare to a force structure that is intended to 
have a strong say in the open seas and the littorals. 
The role of the navy is therefore to maintain control of territorial waters and to 
defend national territory against threats from the sea. This is not only for the sake of 
national sovereignty but also for the sake of NATO membership. The navy’s mission is 
also to help protect the country's sea lines of communications (SLOCs) and to assist 
operations designed to keep the ports open. In addition, it is part of the navy’s mission to 
combat drug smuggling and international terrorism and to prevent large-scale, 
unauthorized, refugee movements.  
During the Cold War, Turkey fulfilled a vital role for NATO in guarding the 
Turkish Straits, the passage through which the Soviet Black Sea Fleet would reach the 
Mediterranean. NATO was concerned that in the event of a conflict, Warsaw Pact forces 
could try to make a swift push through Thrace, the European part of Turkey, to seize the 
  25
Straits. Although this threat has greatly receded with the end of the Cold War, the 
Turkish Straits remain strategically important to Turkey, for a variety of reasons, and 
they figure prominently in Turkish naval planning.  
The 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States prompted the TNFC to take 
additional measures to protect Turkish interests at sea against asymmetric threats. The 
TNFC increased security measures at all military bases and commercial ports, while 
armed coastal vessels have been conducting round-the-clock surveillance in the Black 
Sea, the Aegean Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea in addition to the Bosporus Straits under 
Turkish control. Turkey’s Coast Guard Command has also boosted its strength and added 
coastal vessels to ensure maritime safety and homeland security.  
Safe access to the Aegean and the Mediterranean Sea ports is essential because 
around 90 percent of Turkey’s trade is realized via sea routes.  
The Turkish Navy currently uses: 
• Burak (Type A 69) 
• Barbaros 
• Yavuz 
• Gabya (Perry) 
• Tepe (Knox) class frigates and; 
• Kilic, Kilic II, Yildiz 
• Dogan, Ruzgar 
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III. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON LITTORAL COMBAT 
Several forces shaped what is generally considered the best motor torpedo boat 
(MTB) of World War II, the Schnellboot.33 These included the advancements in internal 
combustion engine technology, the invention of the modern torpedo, the restrictions of 
the 1919 Treaty of Versailles,34 British naval hegemony, and an American contract for a 
luxury yacht. Sometimes referred to as the “S-Boat” or by the United Kingdom (U.K.) 
Royal Navy term (now archaic) “E-Boat” (Enemy Boat), the Schnellboot was a 
formidable assembly of technology, naval architecture, and highly trained men.  
The large, highly capable Schnellboot design was only possible through the 
development of a suitable power plant. Its engine was extremely powerful, compact, 
robust, and relatively lightweight. The Schnellboot engines, like the boats themselves, 
underwent a constant evolutionary process, stressing individual quality and survivability 
over the production of large quantities of expendable materials. The boats were adapted 
to operate in increasingly harsh combat environments and required increases in engine 
performance to counter the growing weight of armor protection, anti-aircraft weaponry, 
and additional crewmen.35  
                                                 
33 The German term Schnellboot literally “speedboat” and its German abbreviation S-boot are used 
throughout along with the plural “Schnellboote” and “S-boote” in preference to the hybrid German/English 
terms “S-boat” and “S-boats.” Similarly German submarines are referred to as “U-boote” Unterseeboote; 
“undersea boats.” 
34 The Treaty of Versailles formally ended World War One between Germany and the Allied Powers 
primarily Great Britain France the United States and Italy was signed on 28 June 1919. 
35 Connelly and Krakow, 2003. 
  28
 
Figure 9.   The Schnellboot Engine Room36 
 
Large and robust, the wartime boats were built to withstand considerable wave 
buffeting, engine vibration, gun recoil, and battle damage. Boat construction took place 
primarily at the Lurssen boatyard in Vegesack, near Bremen. Numerous boats were also 
built by the Schlicht yard in Travemunde, and several were built at the Gusto Werke in 
Schiedam, the Netherlands, and at Danziger Waggonfabrik in Danzig (now Gdansk, 
Poland). The size and complexity of these boats were a drawback to Germany’s industrial 
base, because they demanded large numbers of skilled laborers and considerable material 
resources. 
The Schnellboot’s main battery consisted of two 53.3 cm (21 inch) torpedo tubes 
mounted on the bow. S-boote typically went to action with one torpedo in each tube. 
Cradles for up to four extra torpedoes were mounted on the boat deck; however, two was 
the normal reserve load. Reserve torpedoes were less frequently carried in areas such as 
the English Channel, where the Allies employed effective countermeasures. The weight 
                                                 
36 Connelly and Krakow, 2003. A Schnellboot motorman sits by one of the engines. His right hand is 
moving the throttle based on orders from the bridge which were received on the telegraph to his right. 
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of the torpedoes adversely affected performance, especially of boats with armored Kaltte 
(Skull cap armored bridge dome), and the hit-and-run tactics rarely allowed the five 
minutes it took a well-trained crew to reload a tube. 
 
 
Figure 10.   The Schnellboot Main Armament37 
 
Schnellboote usually operated at night in formations, which made communication 
especially vital to navigation, formation keeping, target location, and attack coordination. 
A type FuG/vaU receiver/transmitter provided high-frequency ship-to-shore radio 
communication, general reception, and long-range communication. 
Maneuvering a Schnellboot in combat required precision navigation and steering 
under the most trying of conditions. The navigator plotted the course on a small table in 
the rear of the wheelhouse. Several compasses were carried on board, including a central 
compass mounted in a binnacle amidships. The captain, navigator, and helmsman had 
smaller compasses mounted in their respective positions. 
                                                 
37 Connelly and Krakow, 2003. A flotilla tender lowers a torpedo onto an S-26 Class Schnellboot in 
Norway. 
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Radio Direction Finding (RDF) equipment was standard aboard S-boote. Its 
distinctive loop antenna fitted into a socket at the rear of the wheelhouse. RDF was used 
to pinpoint a boat’s precise position by triangulating radio transmissions from known 
positions ashore. A skilled operator could use it to locate the position from which an 
enemy ship was transmitting. 
 
 
Figure 11.   The Schnellboot Formation38 
 
Schnellboote relied chiefly on constant radio contact with shore-based radar 
installations and visual/radio monitoring stations for long distance locations of, and 
vectors to, enemy ships. Shore-based radar was effective to within 18 km (11 miles) of 
England’s coast in good weather and gained efficiency closer to the occupied coast. In 
March of 1944, an experimental set designated FuMO 62 “Hohentwiel S” was developed 
and tested for Schnellboot use. It was based on the Luftwaffe’s FuG 200 Hohentwiel anti-
                                                 
38 Connelly and Krakow, 2003. The S-38 Class boat Wulff leads two other S-boote out on patrol. The 
boat’s name is painted on the bridge’s side. A radio antenna mast is mounted on the aft starboard section of 
the bridge. A whimsical wooden parrot decorates the large loop-shaped Radio Direction Finding RDF 
antenna. The Kommandant wears a captured French fleece jacket. Narrow gold embroidery on his cap visor 
indicates he was a junior officer between Leutnant ensign and Kapitanleutnant Lieutenant.  
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surface vessel (ASV) radar. The FuMO 62 had a greater range—approximately 10 km 
(6.2 miles)—and more accuracy than the FuMO 7. However, the 1.2m (4 feet) by 1.2m 
rotating antenna caused a similar increase in radar signature. 
The German engineers recognized the disparity between the high-quality Allied 
radar and less than satisfactory German sets. They developed a number of effective radar 
counter measures, including passive radar detection and ranging. One radar detection 
system gave early warning of enemy forces based on their radar emissions while an S-
boot was still beyond the useful range of the enemy’s own radar. The apparatus 
effectively enabled an S-boot to detect and generally locate the enemy’s presence without 
being located itself. The FuMB Ant 3, code named “Bali 1” antenna was a commonly 
used passive radar detection sensor. The “Bali 1” antenna was part of the FuMB 29 “Bali 
Anlage” radar surveillance system. It could be used with a FuMB 4 “Samos” receiver 
(90-470 MHz), a FuMB 9 frequency indicator (146-264 MHz), or a FuMB 10 “Borkum” 
signal detector (100-400 MHz). The signals were fed through a booster to a FuMZ 1 
oscilloscope, where the operator viewed and interpreted the information. 
 
 
Figure 12.   Radar Detector Antennas of Schnellboote39 
 
The Germans further exploited the weaknesses of enemy radar by deploying radar 
decoy buoys, which mimicked a Schnellboot’s radar signature to confuse the enemy. 
                                                 
39 Connelly and Krakow, 2003. From left to right, the FuMB 32 ‘Flores’ antenna ZA 290M antenna 
FuMB 26 ‘Tunis’ radar detector antenna. 
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Other experiments attempted to find materials that would conceal the boats from enemy 
radar by absorbing or scattering radio signals. A reflection dimming rubberized coating 
known as “Tarnmatte” (Camouflage Mat) was developed and used by S-boote. 
Experiments with passive infrared night vision equipment showed great promise, but by 
the war’s end even the most advanced versions still required a fairly steady platform and 
clear weather conditions. These rendered the equipment ineffective in fog or on moderate 
seas. Passive infrared night vision devices were used with success on heavier ships and at 
land-based observation points.40 
 
 
Figure 13.   S-38 Class Schnellboot with Camouflage41 
 
“It is incomparably more effective to sink a whole cargo than to have to fight the 
unloaded personnel and material separately on land at a later date.” This was how 
German Fuhrer (Leader) Adolf Hitler summarized the underlying strategy of Schnellboot 
operations. Early in the war, Schnellboot captains pressed home many daring close 
quarters attacks on Allied merchant ships and convoys. Luftwaffe air support enabled 
them to travel to and from distant ambush areas during daylight hours. These tactics 
employed against the Western Allies grew more conservative as the Allies’ defenses 
                                                 
40 Connelly and Krakow, 2003. 
41 Connelly and Krakow, 2003. The Schnellboot is painted in hard-edged splotches of browns and 
grays over the Schnellbootweiss finish. The camouflage allowed the boat to better match the snow-covered 
fjord landscape. 
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became more potent and the Schnellboot flotillas’ ranks were thinned. A U.S. Navy 
intelligence report from June of 1944 (which called S-boote ‘E-Boats’) summarized 
Schnellboot operations as follows: 
E-Boats favor night conditions of mist and calm sea luminous conditions 
such as a half moon. They leave their bases in packs and on reaching the 
convoy lanes, split into flotillas of six. Boats with the 40 mm [cannon] 
take stern positions in formation. They move in column formation and are 
generally given accurate radar information from shore. Using hydrophones 
and elementary radar, they move slowly and quietly up for attack (they 
may lay quiet moored to a Channel buoy) and after firing their torpedoes 
use evasive tactics similar to PTs (U.S. Patrol Torpedo boats). The flotilla 
leaders decide the tactics, and their policy up to the present has been to 
avoid combat. These boats attack British small craft only if the prey is 
crippled or vastly inferior in firepower. 
 
 
Figure 14.   S-38 Class Schnellboot before a Mission42 
 
                                                 
42 Connelly and Krakow, 2003. Sailors prepare an S-38 Class Schnellboot for a mission in the Gulf of 
Finland. A depth charge is lowered to the boat from the flotilla tender while crewmen attach mine rails to 
the decks. 
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E-Boats are high speed torpedo boats; neither hull nor armaments are capable of 
resisting the slower British boats. Committed to a policy of conversation of their 
numbers, they decline gunnery duels. They shadow stragglers or damaged boats, make 
quick runs and break away, and even conclusive superiority recently has failed to lure 
them into point blank range. Their marksmanship is mediocre unless given a point of fire 
by long bursts of tracers. They fire high and often fail to close to effective range before 
firing. 
British craft cannot catch them and rarely attempt a running fight with them. 
When countered, E-Boats usually run in formation on the flotilla leader, turning away by 
a ship movement to right or left from column. When circumstances force them to scatter, 
they apparently have a prearranged rendezvous at certain bearing and distance from any 
scramble.43 
 
                                                 
43 Connelly and Krakow, 2003. 
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IV. THE U.S. NAVY LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP (LCS) 
Generally, in battle, use the normal force (direct approach) to engage; use 
the extraordinary (indirect approach) to win. 
Sun Tzu, The Art of War 
 
A. LCS OVERVIEW 
The U.S. has surface combatants, aircraft carriers, submarines, and amphibious 
ships. Historically, surface combatants have accounted for 30% to 40% of the U.S. 
Navy’s combatants.  At the end of FY2005, they accounted for about 35% (99 of 282 
battle force ships). From World War II until the 1980s, surface combatants were viewed 
largely as defensive escorts for protecting Navy surface ships (i.e., aircraft carriers, 
amphibious ships, and auxiliary ships) and commercial cargo vessels. During this period, 
the primary missions of surface combatants were anti-air warfare (AAW) and anti-
submarine warfare (ASW), and designs for Navy surface combatant classes were 
determined in large part by decisions as to whether a given class should emphasize 
AAW, ASW, or both. The largely escort-oriented role of Navy surface combatants 
changed in the 1980s with the advent of three major new systems—the Tomahawk cruise 
missile, the vertical launch system (VLS), and the Aegis combat system.  
The capabilities of Navy surface combatants are currently being enhanced by new 
networking systems such as the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) for air-
defense operations. Networking systems like these enable surface combatants, other 
ships, and aircraft to share large amounts of targeting-quality data on a rapid and 
continuous basis, permitting them to engage in what is called network-centric warfare 
(NCW). 
The capabilities of surface combatants will be enhanced in the coming years by 
the addition of unmanned air, surface, and underwater vehicles electromagnetic rail guns, 
directed-energy weapons such as lasers and improved equipment for detecting and 
countering mines. Some of these developments will be enabled by the application of 
advanced, integrated electric drive propulsion technology to surface combatants. As these 
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developments unfold, surface combatants will likely continue to play a greater role in the 
defense of both themselves and other friendly surface ships against enemy submarines, 
surface ships, aircraft, and anti-ship cruise missiles.44 
On November 1, 2001, the Navy announced that it would issue a revised Request 
for Proposal (RFP) for its future surface combatant program. Formerly known as DD-21 
(for 21st-Century Destroyer), the new program would be known as “DD(X),” and it 
would comprise a family of three new ships: a large multi-mission destroyer from which 
the family took its name, DD(X); a large multi-mission guided missile cruiser, CG(X); 
and a small “focused mission” Littoral Combat Ship, or LCS. For the next several 
decades, these three new “advanced technology surface combatants” will operate 
alongside a large “legacy” force of over 80 multi-mission combatants designed during the 
Cold War for open-ocean warfare against the Soviet Navy. 
The inclusion of the small focused mission LCS in the new DD(X) family of ships 
represented an abrupt reversal in the Navy’s plans for its 21st-century fleet. In a report 
forwarded to the U.S. Congress in March 2000, which outlined the Navy’s 30-year plan 
for shipbuilding, the U.S. Navy had pointedly rejected the potential contribution of small 
combatants in its future battle force. Indeed, the report indicated that the smallest 
combatant in the 21st -century Navy would have a displacement on the order of about 
9,000 tons—over three times the size of current LCS designs.45 
The LCS in some ways is reminiscent of a concept for a small, fast Navy surface 
combatant called the Streetfighter. The Streetfighter study effort began in 1998 and was 
centered at the Naval War College. It was led by Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, who 
became the President of the college that year. In the late 1990s Cebrowski helped to 
develop and publicize the concept of network-centric warfare, and emerged as a leading 
proponent of naval transformation. He retired from the Navy in 2001. From October  
 
 
                                                 
44 O'Rourke and Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service, 2005. 
45 Work and Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Washington, D.C., 2004. 
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2001, a month prior the replacement of the DD-21 program with the DD(X) family of 
ships, through January 31, 2005, he served as the civilian director of the DOD’s Office of 
Force Transformation. 
The Streetfighter study was aimed at generating new naval concepts for fighting 
in heavily defended littoral waters. The Streetfighter concept for a small, fast surface 
combatant, unveiled publicly in 1999, generated significant debate. Supporters viewed it 
as innovative, transformational, and responsive to the U.S. Navy’s needs for affordable, 
littoral-oriented forces. Critics doubted the feasibility of combining high speed, overseas 
sustainability, and significant payload in a small ship, as well as the ability of a small ship 
to survive in combat. The U.S. Navy officials allowed the Streetfighter project to 
proceed, but most navy leaders at the time appeared to resist the idea of a smaller 
combatant. Although U.S. Navy officials have emphasized that the LCS is not the 
Streetfighter proposal of 1999-2001, the LCS—in terms of its littoral orientation, smaller 
size, high speed, and planned reliance on UVs—does appear broadly rooted in some of 
the thinking that came out of the Streetfighter project.46 
In December 2001, the Naval War College was asked to develop and define 
characteristics that would be desirable in a littoral combat ship. The college used a series 
of workshops that included operational and technical experts from throughout the Navy 
to compare three types and sizes of surface combatant ships and describe desirable 
characteristics that such a ship should have. The experts examined such characteristics as 
speed, range, manning, and the ability to operate helicopters and unmanned vehicles. The 
workshop participants also concluded that a potential littoral ship should: 
• be capable of networking with other platforms and sensors; 
• be useful across the spectrum of conflict; 
• be able to contribute to a sustained, forward naval presence; 
• be capable of supporting manned vertical lift aircraft; 
• be capable of operating with reduced manning; 
• have an open architecture and modularity; 
                                                 
46 O'Rourke and Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service, 2005. 
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• be capable of controlling manned and unmanned vehicles, and 
• have organic self-defense capabilities. 
The results of the Naval War College study, which was completed in July 2002, 
were used as a baseline for further developing the concepts for the LCS.  
At this point the U.S. Navy’s analysis was focused on a single solution to address 
littoral capability gaps—a new warship along the lines of the LCS. Between April 2002 
and January 2004, the Navy conducted an analysis of multiple concepts to further define 
the concept that would address the gaps in the littorals. The analysis began by examining 
five different ship concepts for the LCS (later focusing on three concepts for another 
stage in the development) and providing the Navy with insight into the trade-offs 
between features such as size, speed, endurance, and self defense needs. The analysis was 
performed by the U.S. Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division, and drew upon 
expertise throughout the Navy. 
The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff were concerned that the 
Navy’s focus on a single solution did not adequately consider other ways to address 
littoral capability problems. Based on these concerns, in early 2004, the Navy was 
required to more fully consider other potential solutions. The publication of new 
guidance on joint capabilities development in June 2003 also led the Navy to expand its 
analysis beyond the single solution of the proposed new ship to include other potential 
solutions to littoral challenges.47 
As part of the results from the analysis, the U.S. Navy defined littoral capability 
problems, developed requirements to address those problems, and identified and 
examined 11 nonmateriel and three materiel solutions across the joint forces that could be 
used to mitigate problems in the littorals. Nonmateriel solutions refer to the use of 
different operational concepts or methods to meet requirements without buying new 
assets such as additional ships; materiel solutions are those which involve developing 
equipment or systems, such as ships and aircraft. The solutions were analyzed to 
determine the feasibility and risk in mitigating the problems. The Navy’s assessment of 
                                                 
47 O'Rourke and Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service, 2005. 
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feasibility centered on the extent to which each solution addressed the mine, anti-
submarine, and surface capability problems. The Navy’s assessment of risk centered on 
the impacts of each solution on (1) the success of potential operations in the littorals, (2) 
the sensitivity of diplomatic considerations, such as the military support of other nations, 
and (3) the financial considerations involved in choosing that solution. 
Two additional materiel solutions were maritime patrol aircraft and modified 
DDG-51 destroyers. These resulted from the U.S. Navy’s analysis as a result of input 
from the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Program Analysis and Evaluation office 
and the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics office. The Office of the Secretary of 
Defense and the Joint Staff also provided specific questions to the Navy for further 
clarification of the Navy’s ongoing analysis. With these additions, the Program Analysis 
and Evaluation office approved the Navy’s completed analysis as satisfactory to meet the 
requirements of a full analysis of alternatives for the LCS program. Table 4 shows the 
materiel and nonmateriel solutions presented in the Navy’s requirements analysis and the 
results of the U.S. Navy’s analysis of operational feasibility, as well as operational, 
diplomatic, and financial risk.48 
                                                 
48 United States Government Accountability Office, 2005. 
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Table 4.   The U.S. Navy’s Comparison of Materiel and Nonmateriel Solutions for 
Mitigating Problems in the Littorals49 
Based on its analysis, the U.S. Navy concluded that the materiel and nonmateriel 
solutions they examined would not provide better operational and cost-effective solutions 
than the proposed LCS in performing the littoral missions. Using a number of studies of 
threats and analyses of potential military operations in the littoral regions, the U.S. Navy 
developed requirements for the LCS that addressed the identified capabilities and threats 
in the littorals. 
The LCS will be a modular ship. The platform will support mine warfare, anti-
submarine warfare, and anti-surface boat modules. The LCS concept is presently being 
                                                 
49 United States Government Accountability Office, 2005. 
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defined and is envisioned to be an advanced hullform employing open-systems 
architecture modules to undertake a number of missions and to reconfigure in response to 
changes in mission, threat, and technology.50 
According to the LCS Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) Program 
Manager Captain Donald Bancock, U.S. Navy, the development and employment of the 
LCS is like “playing with LEGO’s.” The core will stand by to receive additional blocks 
(modules). The actual mission modules will be delivered in standard-sized cargo 
containers. These containers are lowered through a door in the flight deck into the 
mission module area. The Interface Control Document (ICD) for the LCS states:51 
The LCS platform shall be designed to accommodate multiple 
reconfigurable modular mission packages to accomplish focused missions 
via an open and modular design that provides flexibility and ease of 
upgrade while ensuring rapid and successful installation and integration of 
the mission packages to the platform. To permit use of a wide range of 
both present and future mission systems and to permit platform and 
mission systems to be developed independently, a standard interface in the 
form of a standard technical architecture must be used. The industry shall 
design and build the LCS platform, employing an open modular 
architecture for mission systems based on this standard technical 
architecture. Separately, mission modules will be developed for the LCS 
based on this technical architecture.52  
The LCS is less of a ship and more of a battle network component system 
consisting of a sea frame, a core crew, assorted mission modules, assembled mission 
packages, mission package crews, and a reconfiguration support structure. The total 
system aims for a level of battle modularity that will allow the LCS to undergo a 
complete mission reconfiguration in less than four days including operational testing of 




                                                 
50 Global Security Org., 2006. 
51 Bromley, 2005. 
52 Naval Sea Systems, 2004. 
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degree of modularity would be without precedent in naval history, and would afford a 
21st century total force to adapt itself to confront any existing or evolving access 
challenge in a short period of time.53 
On May 27, 2004, the U.S. Department of Defense announced that Lockheed 
Martin Corporation - Maritime Systems & Sensors, Moorestown, N.J. ($46,501,821) and 
General Dynamics - Bath Iron Works, Bath, Maine ($78,798,188) were each awarded 
contract options for final system designs with options for detailed design and construction 
of up to two phase 0 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS).  
Of the two competing designs, the Lockheed design is a high-speed semi-planing 
monohull, while the General Dynamics design is a slender, stabilized monohull, more 
commonly known as a trimaran. Each of these meets the performance requirements of the 
top-level requirements documents and achieves advantages in several key performance 
parameters.  
Both designs achieve sprint speeds of over 40 knots as well as long-range transit 
distances of over 3,500 miles. The sea frames of each design can accommodate the 
equipment and crews of the focus mission packages and effectively launch, recover and 
control unmanned vehicles for extended periods of time in required sea states. The 
methods by which each launch and recover both aircraft and waterborne craft are 
different.54  
The U.S. Navy plans to procure a total of 55 LCSs. The first was ordered in 
FY2005, and three more are being ordered in FY2006. The FY2005 ship and one of the 
FY2006 ships were procured through the Navy’s research and development account. The 
other two FY2006 ships and all subsequent LCSs are being procured through the 
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) appropriation account. The Navy’s FY2007-
FY2011 shipbuilding plan includes two LCSs in FY2007, three in FY2008, and six per 
year in FY2009-FY2011. 
                                                 
53 Work and Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington, D.C., 2004. 
54 Global Security Org., 2006. 
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Table 5 shows LCS funding through FY2011. The Navy’s FY2007 budget 
submission estimates the total procurement cost of a class of 56 (not 55) LCS sea frames 
at about $17.6 billion in then-year dollars. Using the figures in Tables 5 and 6, when 
other LCS program costs are included, the LCS program could have a total acquisition 
(development plus procurement) cost of more than $26 billion, or more than $470 million 
per ship, in then-year dollars.55  
 
 
Table 5.   The Funding for LCS Program, FY2002–FY201156 
 
FY DD(X) CG(X) LCS DDG(X) 
07 2  2  
08   3  
09 1  6  
10 1  6  
11 1 1 6  
12 1  6  
13 1 1 5  
14  1 6  
15  2 6  
16  1 5  
17  1   
                                                 
55 O'Rourke and Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service, 2006. 
56 U.S. Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, 2006. 
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FY DD(X) CG(X) LCS DDG(X) 
18  2   
19  2   
20  2   
21  2   
22  2   
23  1  1 
24    2 
25    2 
26    2 
27    2 
28    2 
29    2 
30   1 2 
31   1 2 
32   2 2 
33   3 2 
34   6 2 
35   6 2 
36   4 2 
Table 6.   Projected Procurement of Surface Combatants, FY2007–FY203657 
 
                                                 
57 U.S. Department of the Navy, 2006. 
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Table 7.   LCS Acquisition Timeline58 
 
B. LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP CORE CAPABILITIES  
The Littoral Combat Ship is a magnificent concept. It is a critical element 
of U.S. surface combatant family of ships, which also includes DD(X) 
destroyer, the CG(X) cruiser, and fleet of multi-mission AEGIS guided-
missile destroyers and cruisers. The Complementary capabilities of these 
transformational warships will be successful across the full spectrum of 
operational requirements demanded of surface force for years to come. 
Rear Admiral Mark Edwards 
Director of Surface Warfare on the Navy Stuff 
 
Mission requirements for the LCS program are technically covered (i.e., 
“grandfathered”) by the MNS that was issued for the old SC-21 (i.e., DD-21) program. 
The analysis behind the SC-21 MNS, however, did not focus on potential anti-access 
challenges in littoral waters. The U.S. Navy’s requirement for additional capability for 
countering enemy submarines, surface attack craft, and mines in littoral waters is based 
                                                 
58 United States Government Accountability Office, 2005. 
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on an analysis that the Navy performed initially in February 2001, which did focus on 
potential anti-access challenges in littoral waters, and was aimed at identifying gaps or 
weakness in the capabilities of the Navy. The Navy refined this analysis further in 2001 
and 2002 and then issued mission requirements for the LCS in a preliminary design 
interim requirements document.59 The document states:  
The primary threat to sea based U.S. joint forces will be from mines, 
aircraft, ships, boats, submarines, and coastal defense units armed with 
Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM) and submarine-launched torpedoes. 
Mines present the most challenging threat because they can be deployed 
from ships and aircraft, both military and civilian, and can also be 
deployed from submarines. Significant threats will also come from air and 
ship launched torpedoes; fighter-launched Tactical Air-to-Surface 
Missiles; other ordnance carried by sea and land-based aircraft (fixed- and 
rotary-wing); chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons; and in the future, 
directed energy weapons. While operating in the littoral regions, 
additional threats from coastal defense sites (artillery, missile, multiple 
rocket launchers, and possibly torpedoes,) small boats, and Tactical 
Ballistic Missiles may be encountered. A third tier threat will include 
preemptive attacks or covert action from special operations forces, combat 
divers, and terrorists. The weapons threats may be supported by C3 
[command, control, and communications], electronic attack, and electronic 
support [i.e., electronic eavesdropping] systems. 
The LCS will deliver focused mission capabilities to enable joint and friendly 
forces to operate effectively in the littoral. These focused mission capabilities are an 
enhanced mine warfare capability, a better shallow-water ASW capability, and an 
effective counter to small craft. There are other capabilities inherent in the LCS that 
support other missions such as Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) and Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). 
While operating in open waters, warships count on the inherent difficulties in 
scouting such vast areas to conceal their positions. Most countries lack reconnaissance 
and surveillance capabilities to detect and localize the U.S. Naval Forces far out at sea. 
This changes, however, if U.S. Naval Forces move closer to the enemy’s coast to conduct 
littoral sea control, protect friendly or neutral merchant shipping, or bring targets ashore 
                                                 
59 U.S. Department of the Navy, 2003. 
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within range of the U.S. Navy’s power projection. Having to fight in the enemy’s 
neighborhood can offset the U.S. advantages in training and equipment, as it drastically 
simplifies enemy scouting, logistics, force-concealment, and weapon-range problems. 
Contemporary mines, diesel/air-independent-propulsion submarines, fast guided-missile 
patrol boats, land-based aircraft, and coastal anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) sites 
present the naval forces with a conventional multiaxis, multiple warfare area problems 
and the threat grows the closer the U.S. Naval Forces steam toward maritime choke 
points or the coast. In addition, small boats pose an unconventional threat when used for 
harassment, attack by light standoff weapons such as rocket-propelled grenades, or the 
delivery of explosive devices. They limit the U.S. Naval Forces ability to quickly 
determine the threat posed by a contact. Such attacks are easily conducted in coastal 
waters, and if the attackers are of sufficient number, they can saturate and overwhelm a 
force’s defenses.60 
The LCS was designed to succeed in spite of these threats. Its modular design, 
which permits mission-oriented outfitting, and small size will allow the LCS squadrons to 
fight where the U.S. would not risk an expensive major combatant during the first days of 
combat. The risk, though, is that the fast, lightweight, heavily armed, and relatively 
inexpensive LCS will start growing in size, displacement, and expense as pet missions 
and extraneous capabilities are added beyond the original concept.61 
The LCS is about taking the fight into the enemy’s home waters – the shallow 
waters that wreak havoc on long-range Cold War-era sonar; waters with dense maritime 
traffic that can challenge the building and maintenance of a recognized maritime picture 
and blur the lines between friend and foe; and tactically complex waters that provide 
shallow-draft warships excellent locations for scouting, attacking, and concealment.  
The LCS is not another ship for the battle group; it is not appropriate for 
screening carriers. It is not intended for area air defense of forces ashore, deep strikes 
inland with cruise missiles such as the Tomahawk, logistics transportation, or floating 
                                                 
60 Solomon, 2004. 
61 Solomon, 2004. 
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medical care. It cannot house the communications suite and does not have the space 
required for a forward command-and-control center. Troops ashore will be best supported 
by extended-range naval gunfire from ships with the proposed advanced gun system and 
follow-on electromagnetic rail guns, not the LCS.  
What the LCS will do is open the door that permits putting those troops ashore. If 
the U.S. wants a ship that can counter the many asymmetric threats the U.S. faces now 
and expects to face in the future in coastal waters, the LCS must be built as an advance 
scout and hunter/killer for a battle force in high-threat environments, and as an interdictor 
and raider in low- and intermediate-threat environments. It operates most effectively 
when it is part of a fully networked LCS squadron that masses the capabilities of its 
combined sensors and weapons across all threat warfare areas.62 
C. WEAPON SYSTEMS AND MISSION PACKAGES FOR THE LITTORAL 
COMBAT SHIP 
For anti-surface warfare, a coastal combatant is best armed when it has sufficient 
anti-ship missiles to saturate and achieve firepower kill against threat warships. Harpoon 
canisters could be enclosed within a low-RCS box launcher outside the ship’s skin that 
conforms to the ship’s overall physical profile. However, Harpoon is not appropriate for 
all threats and is overkill against small vessels.  
The NATO Sea Sparrow has an excellent anti-surface capability, and with the 
upcoming introduction of the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) would be a suitable 
weapons choice. An advantage of the ESSM is that it was engineered for the vastly 
differing combat systems of multiple nations’ warships – it is built to be adaptable.  
As Aegis is too big and excessive for the LCS mission,  the LCS requires a new 
search radar with the ability to automatically track many low-RCS contacts at all 
altitudes; particularly those at low elevations. It also must be fully integrated with the 
LCS combat system and capable of automatically detecting and engaging threats at 
ranges that permit reengagement if the first defensive salvo fails.  
                                                 
62 Solomon, 2004. 
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A large inventory of standoff active electronic countermeasures, such as the 
NULKA decoy system, and traditional passive countermeasures, such as chaff and flares, 
will round out the LCS’s shield against advanced ASCMs.  
Undersea threats present the greatest challenge to the LCS. The shallow water 
column, high ambient noise, and amount of debris near a coastline complicate the 
acoustic problem for littoral anti-submarine warfare. Lower-frequency active sonar, such 
as the legacy AN/SQS-53 series, suffer from reverberation in waters like these. The LCS 
needs small, hull-mounted, high-frequency active sonar for mine avoidance.63 
Tables 8 and 9 show anti-submarine warfare and surface warfare mission 
packages status. 
 
Table 8.   Anti-submarine Warfare Mission Package Status64 
 
Table 9.   Surface Warfare Mission Package Status65 
                                                 
63 Solomon, 2004. 
64 United States Government Accountability Office, 2005. 
65 United States Government Accountability Office, 2005. 
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More than 350,000 sea mines are estimated to be stockpiled around the world. 
Surf-zone mines, shallow-water mines, deep-water mines, moored mines, bottom mines, 
floating mines, rising mines, and mines deployed from unsophisticated or cleverly 
configured ships and barges (as evidenced during Operation Iraqi Freedom) are part of an 
array of threats. As the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps refine the concept of sea basing in 
support of joint forcible entry, littoral mine counter measure (MCM) capability will 
become increasingly important. 
The U.S. current mine warfare force consists of 14 Avenger-class (MCM- 1) 
minesweepers, 12 Osprey-class (MHC-51) coastal mine hunters, and two squadrons of 
MH-53E helicopters. As the organic mine warfare systems reach their initial operating 
capability and enter the U.S. fleet in adequate numbers, legacy mine warfare forces can 
begin to be retired. Osprey-class mine hunters are the least capable of the U.S. mine 
warfare ships and could be retired first. They may be of use to U.S. allies in the Persian 
Gulf and western Pacific where there will be significant mine threats. 
The LCS’s mine warfare mission package (Table 10) will include mine-hunting, 
minesweeping, and mine-neutralizing systems. Mine hunting locates and identifies mines 
for neutralization. Minesweeping does not identify individual mines, but puts acoustic 
and magnetic energy into the water to fulfill the target detection parameters and detonate 
any mines in the swept area. If warning time were available, the submarine-launched 
long-term mine reconnaissance system (or follow-on mission reconfigurable unmanned 
underwater vehicles) could conduct covert surveys of transit routes and potential joint- 
operating areas to determine the presence and location of minefields. Depending on the 
size of the suspected minefield or area to be cleared, one or more LCSs with mine- 
warfare mission packages would be vectored to the area. Standing a safe distance from 
the suspected minefield, the MH-60S helicopter would be launched with the airborne 
laser mine detection system (ALMDS) to provide a rapid, broad-area search for surface- 
or near-surface-moored mines. As areas closest to the ship are searched, remote mine-
hunting vehicles (RMVs) would be launched towing the AQS-20A mine-hunting sonar. 
RMVs will perform better than helicopters in this role because of their persistence 
(longer than 14-hour mission time) and ability to work around the clock. (The MH-60S 
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mission time is less than two hours when towing the AQS-20A, and few helicopter pilots 
relish the opportunity to fly at 100 feet, at night, with a nose-down attitude, and with the 
out-of-balance flight required for towing.) Future unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) 
also might fill a mine-hunting role. 
In areas unsuitable for mine hunting, or if rapid mine clearance is required, 
unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) and the MH-60S could tow the organic airborne- 
surface-influence and acoustic minesweeping system. As with RMVs towing the AQS-
20A, USVs are more suitable for sweeping because their mission duration is significantly 
longer than an MH-60S helicopters in the tow mode, and because USVs can tow around 
the clock.66 
A full load displacement draft of 10 feet allows the LCSs to access very shallow 
waters. The ships will have a top speed of about 50 knots and the range at sprint speed is 
1,500 nm. At an economical speed of 20 knots, the range is 4,300 nm. 
The LCSs are configured with a helicopter deck and hangar. The deck is capable 
of the launch and recovery of the MH-60R/S helicopter and a tactical unmanned air 
vehicle. The ships can carry out aircraft launch and recovery in conditions up to Sea State 
5, i.e., in winds up to 27 knots and average wave heights between 6.4 ft. and 9.6 ft. The 
ships will be capable of launching and recovering watercraft, i.e. 40 ft. high-speed boats, 
within 15 minutes in conditions of Sea State 4, i.e., waves up to 5 ft. and winds up to 21 
knots.  
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Table 10.   Mine Warfare Mission Package Status67  
 
The ships will carry provisions for 21 days before replenishments and will also be 
able to replenish underway. The crew size will be between 15 and 50 and accommodation 
will be provided for up to 75 ship and special mission crew. The operational availability 
is expected to be 95%. 
The ship has core capabilities for defense and network communications. They will 
be equipped with radar and sonar sensors. Core capabilities will include the deployment 
of a Fire Scout Unmanned Air Vehicle, the AQS-20 towed mine-hunting multiple beam 
sonar a unmanned ribbed boat and the Spartan Unmanned Surface Vehicle that is 
equipped with a basic payload of navigation radar, infrared camera, and video camera. 
Other payloads being considered for the Spartan include an anti-surface warfare (ASuW) 
missile system or a gun and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) mine-hunting sonar.68 
D. LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP PRIMARY MISSIONS 
The LCS primary missions are those that ensure and enhance friendly force access 
to littoral areas. Access-focused missions include the following primary missions: 
• Anti-surface warfare (ASuW) against hostile small boats 
• Mine Counter Measures (MCM) 
• Littoral Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) 
                                                 
67 United States Government Accountability Office, 2005. 
68 Naval Technology Web Page, 2006. 
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• Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
• Homeland Defense / Maritime Intercept 
• Special Operations Forces support 
• Logistic support for movement of personnel and supplies.69 
The packages for these primary missions will enable the LCS to: 
• Detect, classify, and identify surface, moored, and bottom mines in order 
to permit maneuvering in or use of selected sea areas.  
• Coordinate/support mission planning and execution with joint and 
combined assets in the absence of dedicated mine warfare (MW) 
command and control platforms. MW mission planning will include the 
use of organic and remotely operated sensors. The LCS will exchange 
MW tactical information including Mine Danger Areas (MDA), mine 
locations, mine types, environmental data, bottom maps, off-board system 
locations, planned search areas and confidence factors.  
• Conduct mine reconnaissance.  
• Perform bottom mapping.  
• Perform minefield breakthrough punch-through operations using off-board 
systems.  
• Perform minesweeping using off-board mission system.  
• Conduct precise location and reporting of a full range of MCM contact 
data. For example: identify mines and non-mine bottom objects.  
• Perform mine neutralization.  
• Employ, reconfigure, and support MH-60S for MW operations.  
• Deploy an EOD detachment.  
• Deploy, control, and recover off-board systems, and process data from off-
board systems. 
• Conduct integrated surface surveillance using onboard and off-board 
sensors.  
• Discriminate and identify friendly and neutral surface vessels from surface 
enemy threats in high-density shipping environments.  
• Conduct coordinated SUW mission planning, contribute to and receive the 
common tactical picture, and initiate engagement of surface threats. 
Maintain and share situational awareness and tactical control in a 
coordinated SUW environment. When operating in company with other 
                                                 
69 Global Security Org., 2006. 
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SUW assets, such as fixed-wing/rotary wing attack aircraft and maritime 
patrol aircraft, the LCS must be capable of planning and coordinating the 
SUW mission.  
• Engage surface threats independently, as part of a LCS group, and in 
coordination with other friendly forces. This includes threats in the line-
of-sight and over-the-horizon. In addition to hard kill capabilities, the LCS 
will use agility and speed, signature management, and soft kill measures to 
disrupt the threat’s detect-to-engage sequence and conduct offensive 
operations against surface threats.  
• Deploy, control, and recover off-board systems and process data from off-
board systems.  
• Employ, reconfigure, and support MH-60 series helicopters and smaller 
rotary wing aircraft for SUW operations.  
• Conduct SUW Battle Damage Assessment after engagements against 
surface threats. 
• Conduct offensive ASW operations. The LCS must achieve a mission 
abort or sink a threat submarine if the submarine target of interest is 
transiting through a designated key choke point or operating (i.e., 
patrolling) in a designated search/surveillance area.  
• Conduct defensive ASW operations. The LCS must defeat threat 
submarine attacks against units operating in company with carrier strike 
Groups, expeditionary strike groups, or LCS squadrons. The LCS must 
achieve a mission abort or sink a threat submarine that poses a threat to 
any friendly units.  
• Conduct coordinated ASW, contribute to the Common Undersea Picture, 
maintain and share situational awareness and tactical control in a 
coordinated ASW environment.  
• Maintain the surface picture while conducting ASW in a high-density 
shipping environment.  
• Detect, classify, localize, track, and attack diesel submarines operating on 
batteries in a shallow water environment (including submarines resting on 
the sea floor.)  
• Perform acoustic range prediction and ASW search planning.  
• Conduct integrated undersea surveillance employing on-board and off-
board systems.  
• Achieve a mission kill of ASW threats through engagement with hard kill 
weapons from on-board and off-board systems.  
• Employ signature management and soft kill systems to counter and disrupt 
the threat’s detect-to-engage sequence in the littoral environment.  
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• Deploy, control, recover, and conduct day and night operations with towed 
and off-board systems, and process data from off-board systems.  
• Employ, reconfigure, and support MH-60R in ASW operations.  
• Conduct ASW Battle Damage Assessment after engagements against 
undersea threats.  
• Support a Naval Special Warfare (NSW) Task Unit and surface/subsurface 
combatant craft and mobility platforms; or their JSOF equivalent 
including weapons and equipment storage, berthing, C4ISR connectivity, 
and space within the hull for mission planning and rehearsal.  
• Launch, recover, and conduct organic maintenance on multiple embarked 
and organic craft. 
• Support Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [MEU 
(SOC)] and JSOF hostage rescue operations and aircraft operations for 
helicopters such as the MH-60S.  
• Support maritime special operations with the capability to refuel MK V 
special operations craft (SOC) and follow-on (special operations forces) 
medium range insertion craft (MRIC).  
• Support SOF in noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO).  
• Provide compressed air (diver quality) for the SEAL delivery vehicle 
(SDV).  
• Embark a fly away recompression chamber (FARC).  
• Support and conduct combat search and rescue (CSAR) operations.  
E. LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP PROPOSED DESIGNS 
U.S. Navy planners are acquiring two different prototypes of the Littoral Combat 
Ship. A (1) Lockheed Martin team will tap its Aegis expertise to deploy COMBATSS-21, 
an acronym for component-based total ship system. A (2) General Dynamics team, 
meanwhile, is enlisting partners to help build the core mission systems infrastructure. 
Both the Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics teams say their systems will rely on 
open architecture and commercial-off-the-self (COTS) technologies. Team members say 
they will use the latest commercial software and enable simple, frequent hardware 
upgrades. Both teams are relying on software reuse to borrow components from a handful 




Martin vessel is a semi-planing monohull about the size of an Oliver Hazard Perry class 
frigate, while the General Dynamics version is a three hulled catamaran, roughly 
comparable in size to an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer.70   
1. Lockheed Martin LCS Design 
The Lockheed Martin (LM) team design (Figure 15), a proven semi-planing steel 
monohull, provides outstanding agility and high-speed maneuverability with known 
seakeeping characteristics to support launch and recovery operations, mission execution, 
and optimum crew comfort. The Lockheed Martin-led team includes the naval 
architectural firm Gibbs & Cox, shipbuilders Marinette Marine and Bollinger 
Shipyards.71 
Lockheed Martin’s LCS is based on technologies introduced by Italian 
shipbuilder Fincantieri on the 1,000 t Destriero commercial vessel, which holds the 
transatlantic speed record, and the 3,000 t Jupiter Class. The ship has a steel hull with 
aluminum superstructure and will be powered by two Rolls-Royce MT30 36MW gas 
turbines and two Fairbanks Morse Colt-Pielstick 16PA6B STC diesel engines driving 
four large, acoustically optimized Rolls-Royce waterjets. Four Isotta Fraschini Model 
V1708 ship service diesel generator sets provide auxiliary power. The ship’s maximum 
speed is 45 knots. The overall length is 115.5 meters. The maximum beam width is 13.1 
meters and the draft is 3.7 meters.72 Figures 16 and 17 show different sections of LM’s 
LCS. 
 
                                                 
70 Ames, 2004. 
71 Lockheed Martin, 2006. 
72 Naval Technology Web Page 2006. 
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Figure 15.   General Concept of LM LCS73 
 
 
Figure 16.   LM LCS Side Door, Launch, Recovery and Handling System, Flight Deck, 
and Stern Ramp74 
 
                                                 
73 Global Security Org., 2006. 
74 Global Security Org., 2006. 
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Figure 17.   LM LCS Crew Areas, Aircraft Hangar, and Weapon Module Stations75 
 
Lockheed Martin engineers tested a complete ship system by installing it aboard 
Sea Slice, an experimental, 104-foot, four-hulled U.S. Navy catamaran. Sea Slice 
participated in Fleet Battle Experiment Juliet, a joint service exercise in July 2002. The 
ship’s role was to imitate the future LCS and demonstrate Navy requirements such as the 
ability to quickly add different modules for new missions and update the modules for a 
new battle task each time. Sailors used COMBATTS to run the ships radar, identify 
friend or foe (IFF) system, NetFires missiles, and Millennium Gun. The Lockheed Martin 
engineers also tested earlier versions of COMBATTS aboard the Swift when the vessel 
deployed to the Persian Gulf in 2002. After that deployment, the Lockheed Martin 
engineers improved the system to handle 3D radar, the MK3 57 mm gun, and ICWS Plus, 
which includes a control suite to handle the LCS suite of off-board vehicles, such as 
helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles, and remote mine hunters.76 
While more than a football field in length, the Lockheed Martin LCS can operate 
in extremely shallow water–giving the ship access to thousands more ports and littoral 
waters worldwide than today’s Navy combatants. It can turn 360 degrees in less than 
eight boat lengths at its rated sprint speed; it also can accelerate to full speed in less than 
                                                 
75 Global Security Org., 2006. 
76 Ames, 2004. 
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two minutes. The design combines high-speed maneuverability with a comfortable 
seakeeping motion that supports launch and recovery, combat operations, and optimal 
performance from the crew. The semi-planing monohull design provides transformational 
performance with a high degree of confidence. With all these capabilities Lockheed 
Martin’s LCS will be equipped with TRS-3D surveillance and target acquisition radar 
system for better C4ISR operations.77   
 
 
Figure 18.   LM LCS Mission Systems, Fully Integrated Comms Suite78 
 
 
Figure 19.   LM LCS Modular Weapon Zone79 
                                                 
77 Lockheed Martin, 2004. 
78 Global Security Org., 2006. 
79 Global Security Org., 2006. 
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Specifications 
Category  Threshold Level  Objective Level 
Total Price per Ship Meet CAIV target in the REP  Exceed CAIV target in the REP 
Hull Service Life  20 Years  30 Years 
Draft at Full load 
Displacement  
20 feet  10 feet 
Sprint Speed at Full 
Load Displacement in 
Sea State #  
40 Knots in Sea State 3   50 Knots in Sea State 3  
Range at Sprint Speed  1,000 nautical miles   1,500 nautical miles  
Range at Economical 
Speed  
3,500 nautical miles (>18 knots) with 
payload 
4,300 nautical miles (20 knots) with 
payload 
Aviation Support Embark and hangar: one MH-60R/S 
and VTUAVs, and a flight deck 
capable of operating, fueling, 
reconfiguring, and supporting MH-
60R/S/UAVsNTUAVs 
Embark and hangar: one MH-60R/S and 
VTUAV5, and a flight deck capable of 




Sea State 4 best heading   Sea State 5 best heading  
Watercraft 
Launch/Recover  
Sea State 3 best heading with in 45. 
mins.  
Sea State 4 best heading with in 15 mins.  
Mission Package Boat 
type  
11 Meter RHIB  40 ft High Speed Boat 
Time for Mission 
Package Change-Out 
to full operational 
capability including 
system OPTEST 
4 days 1 days 




CONREP VERTREP and RAS  CONREP VERTREP and RAS 
Mission Module 
Payload (note 3) 
180 MT (105 MT mission package / 75 
MT mission package fuel) 
210 MT (130 MT mission package / 80 
MT mission package fuel) 
Core Crew Size  50 Core Crew Members  15 Core Crew Members 
Crew 
Accommodations 
(both core crew and 
mission package 
detachments) 
75 personnel 75 personnel 
Operational 
Availability (Ao)  
0.85  0.95 




                                                 
80 Global Security Org., 2006. 
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The laying of the keel celebrates an important milestone in the life of the USS 
FREEDOM (LCS 1) and marks a significant event for the construction of the U.S.’s first 
Littoral Combat Ship. The USS FREEDOM (LCS 1) will be delivered to the Navy in late 
2006. Figure 20 shows the emblem of the first LCS – USS Freedom. 
 
 
Figure 20.   Emblem of USS Freedom (LCS 1)81 
 
2. General Dynamics LCS Design 
The General Dynamics (GD) approach (Figure 23) features an innovative 
trimaran hull that enables the ship to reach sustainable speeds of nearly 50 knots and a 
range as far as 10,000 nautical miles with a large interior volume and payload. The ship is 
designed to allow a crew of fewer than 40 sailors to fully operate, maintain, and defend it.  
Key characteristics of the ship proposed by the General Dynamics team include:  
• Capable of supporting several missions simultaneously. Open-architecture 
information systems enable over-the-horizon surveillance and 
reconnaissance; global networking; and coordinated air, surface, and 
undersea tactical picture.  
• Incorporation of stealth technologies increases ship and crew survivability.  
                                                 
81 Lockheed Martin, 2006. 
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• Shallow draft allows operations near the shore. (Figure 21)  
• Large payloads per ton of displacement.   
• Huge interior volume delivers enhanced mission capabilities and 
endurance.  
• Supports concurrent and simultaneous operation of two large (SH-60) 
helicopters. (Figure 22) 
The General Dynamics LCS team will complete the design and construct a high-
speed, 127-meter surface combatant ship for delivery to the Navy in October 2007. It will 
have a large usable payload volume and will provide the flexibility to carry out one 
mission while a separate mission module is in reserve. Its large flight deck sits higher 
above the water than any other U.S. Navy surface combatant and will support near-
simultaneous operation of two SH-60 helicopters or multiple unmanned vehicles. And its 
open-architecture electronics suite significantly contributes to the ship’s ability to 
facilitate a wide range of missions, while incorporating stealth technology to increase 
crew and ship survivability.82  
Bath Iron Works is leading a team that includes Austal USA (Mobile, Alabama), 
which is responsible for building the team’s aluminum and steel trimaran warship. 
General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems (Arlington, Virginia.), is leading the 
ship’s open-architecture-based Core Mission System design and integration from its 
Pittsfield, Massachusetts, facility.83 
Members of the Bath Iron Works / General Dynamics team include: 
• BAE Systems Applied Technologies Inc., (Rockville, Maryland.), to build 
the ship’s internal and external communications systems, as well as 
topside antenna modeling and mission module-interface coordination; 
• CAE USA Inc., Marine Systems, (Leesburg, Virginia.), to be responsible 
for the ship automation and control system; 
• Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems, (Baltimore, Maryland),  to be 
responsible for Integrated Combat Management System (ICMS); 
 
                                                 
82 General Dynamics, 2006. 
83 PR Newswire Association, 2006. 
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• General Dynamics Armament and Technical Products, (Charlotte, North 
Carolina) to be responsible for all of the weapons and effectors; 
• General Dynamics (Canada, Ottawa), to be responsible for the above-and 
below-water sensors. 
The team approach builds on the General Dynamics Total Ship Computing 
Environment, a system that includes net-centric naval-combat management, real-time 
command and control, command support, and integrated shipboard sensors and weapons. 
It also includes Northrop Grumman’s ICMS, which is the U.S. version of the TACTICOS 
combat management system, currently installed onboard more than 80 naval ships from 
11 countries.84   
 
SPECIFICATIONS 
Length 127.1 meters 
Beam 30.4 meters 
Draft 4.5 meters 
Sprint Speed 45 knots 
Propulsion 2 Gas Turbines, 2 Diesel Engines, 4 Steerable Waterjets,      
1 Steerable Thruster  
Armament Surface to Air Missile Launcher, 57 mm Gun, Minor 
Caliber Guns, Decoys, and Countermeasures 
Table 12.   GD LCS Specifications85 
                                                 
84 Ames, 2004. 
85 General Dynamics, 2006. 
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Figure 21.   GD LCS Trimaran Design86 
 
 
Figure 22.   GD LCS Top View87 
 
                                                 
86 Lockheed Martin, 2006. 
87 Lockheed Martin, 2006. 
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Figure 23.   GD LCS Front View88 
 
F. LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP CREW TRAINING  
One of the challenges you have in building a ship is that you have these 
ebbs and flows of activity for the crew. Because we have such a small 
crew, it’s less of an issue for us. We’ll have another increment of orders 
cut within the next couple of months. We have to get those sailors on 
board so that they can get to vendor training for the new systems on the 
ship and the Navy training for some of the systems. This is a very different 
process to train those people, so we are bringing them on board fairly early 
relative to other shipbuilding processes. 
Cmdr. Donald Gabrielson 
Commanding Officer of the USS Freedom (LCS 1) 
 
                                                 
88 Lockheed Martin, 2006. 
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The U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) USS Freedom will be the first 
major vessel to become operational in the service’s new family of advanced, networked 
ships designed for littoral operations. The LCS class will act as a platform for launch and 
recovery of manned and unmanned vehicles and its modular design will support 
interchangeable mission packages that will allow the ship to be reconfigured on an as-
needed basis. It will be the first U.S. major combat ship to feature embedded training 
systems from its very inception.  
To coordinate the development and implementation of training systems for all 
classes of old and new ships, the U.S. Navy has established the Total Ship Training 
(TST) program, a part of the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) organization. The 
U.S. Navy has concluded that embedded training systems offer several advantages over 
other current surface-training systems such as separate add-on trainers appended to ship 
systems to simulate sensors and send simulated images to operators. 
In the case of new ships like the LCS, the U.S. Navy has the opportunity to write 
all of its training requirements on a new slate. Providing the most effective on-demand 
training is particularly important for this class of ship, since it is optimally manned with a 
core seaframe crew of only 40. Training must also be provided for new combat and 
operations systems, as well as for different types of combat scenarios. 
General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems (GDAIS) is the lead training 
contractor for the General Dynamics variant. In addition to initial training systems and 
courseware, the LCS seaframe contractors will be responsible for all updates and changes 
to the training curriculum to accommodate changes in U.S. Navy doctrine, operations, 
and equipment. Any electronic courseware deployed for the LCS will have to comply 
with the standards and structure of the navy integrated learning environment. All 
subsystem providers will have to provide all training materials to the LCS training 
contract lead company.89  
 
                                                 
89 Weirauch, 2005. 
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The U.S. Navy is developing the first group of sailors to serve on a vessel that is 
revolutionary in its technology as well as in how it will be manned and employed. To 
aptly prepare the crew members, the service is revamping some of its training curricula 
so these sailors can handle the multitude of tasks required in a totally systems- integrated 
environment. This is the first time the groundwork for a ship’s manning as well as its 
training requirements is being based on job-task analyses conducted across the enlisted 
community. 
Although the LCS seaframe is comparable in size to a frigate, crew size cannot be 
compared absolutely. While a frigate goes to sea with a crew of approximately 200 on 
board, plans for the LCS seaframe call for it to be manned by a core crew of 40 
personnel: eight officers and 32 enlisted personnel. If a mission involves the use of 
helicopters, an aviation deck crew of 20 individuals is added to support helicopter 
operations. Because the capabilities of the LCS are modular, further additions to the crew 
will depend on the specific mission. 
Recognizing that a traditional approach for assigning sailors to ships would not be 
adequate for LCS crews, the U.S. Navy analyzed job tasks, identified the required skills, 
and crafted what it calls Human Capital Objects (HCOs) that comprise information about 
work, workers, and workplaces. HCOr refers to the work and workplace requirements; 
HCOi refers to the individual with the skills to accomplish the tasks.  
The LCS design revamps the typical ship. Capt. Rick Easton states: 
Technologically, one of the other key aspects that’s revolutionary in the 
ship is that we have a single computing environment that links all of the 
weapons systems into the same computer and plugs the mission module 
into that computing environment that also runs the ship’s navigation, 
engineering and all the administrative functions. So this is really the first 
time that we've had a completely integrated computing environment on a 
ship. The TSCE watch stander is the one who’s responsible for 
monitoring, maintaining, running and operating that computing 
environment. It’s a very big job, and you can see how it would then draw 
skill sets that cross all of our systems and all the various ratings. When 
you have the optimum number of people-a critically manned crew-there’s 
not time to do training based on a large apprentice base of sailors aboard 
the ship. So we’re going to have to do that training ashore, and we're 
going to have to do that training in the future aided by computer-based as 
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well as simulation technology. We are moving today to purchase the 
shore-based operations trainer that’s going to provide functionality for 
what we have in the past known as the Combat Information Center, which 
in this ship is the Mission Control Center.90 
Computers and simulation also are likely to support training for the bridge 
operations because a number of systems management consoles will be located on the 
bridge, including navigation control, engineering plant management, and combat 
systems.91 
The U.S. Navy plans to rotate multiple crews in three- to four-month cycles on the 
LCSs applying a technique that has increased the operational availability of legacy 
surface ships in previous experiments. Crew swapping on the Sea Fighter and Swift has 
shown that after about 90 to 120 days of constant operations, “the crews drag a little bit, 
and it’s a nice time to do the swap,” according to Vice Adm. Terrance Etnyre, 
Commander of Naval Surface Forces. Requirements for conducting proficiency training 
tend to be quarterly anyway, so the three- to four-month crew rotation would fit in well 
with training needs. But when the LCS actually gets under way, sailors probably will 
recommend improvements to the crewing concept. The LCS is expected to operate at a 
high tempo, and there will not be much time for crews to train at sea. Therefore, much of 
the training would be done at the ship’s home port through simulators when the crew is 
not at sea.92 
                                                 
90 Lawlor, 2005. 
91 Lawlor, 2005. 
92 Inside Washington Publishers, 2006. 
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V. ASSETS FOR LITTORAL COMBAT USED BY OTHER 
COUNTRIES 
A. VISBY CLASS CORVETTE (SWEDEN) 
The Visby Class of stealth corvettes is being built for the Swedish Navy by the 
Swedish company Kockums (a subsidiary of ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems of 
Germany). Construction began in 1996 at Kockums’ Kalrskrona yard. The Visby (K31) 
was launched in June 2000 and was delivered to the FMV (the Swedish Defense Materiel 
Administration) in June 2002 for fitting with weapons and combat systems. Entry into 
service is scheduled for early 2006. The second ship in this class, HMS Helsingborg 
(K32), was launched in June 2003 and the third, Harnosand (K33), in December 2004. 
The other hulls are: Nykoping (K34) and Karlstad (K35). The five Visby class vessels are 
to be delivered to the Swedish Navy by 2007. The Swedish Navy has an option on a sixth 
vessel (Uddevalla K36).  
The primary missions of the first four Visby corvettes for the Swedish Navy are 
mine countermeasures (MCM) and anti-submarine warfare (ASW). The last vessel will 
be primarily performing attack and anti-surface warfare roles. A helicopter, such as the 
AgustaWestland A109M selected by Sweden, can land, take off, and refuel on the upper 
deck. Preparation has been made for the installation of a hangar on the ship.  
Kockums has signed a partnership agreement with Northrop Grumman Ship 
Systems, under which Kockums will join Northrop Grumman’s team for the U.S. Navy’s 
Focused Mission Vessel Study for the design of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).93 
The Visby-class corvette is the first naval vessel to feature fully developed stealth 
technology, and is constructed using carbon fiber. This makes these ships extremely 
difficult to detect, even when using the most modern and sophisticated radar and IR-
sensor systems. The Visby corvette is designed to keep all signatures to a minimum. The 
hull features large, flat surfaces and sharp edges. Anything that is not absolutely essential 
on the outside of the hull or superstructure has been built into the main body of the ship, 
                                                 
93 Naval Technology Web Page, 2006. 
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or stays hidden under hatches. To ensure a minimal IR-signature, the gas turbine exhaust 
pipes and emissions are specially shielded at the stern, close to the surface of the water. 
The hull is entirely nonmagnetic, and onboard equipment is either demagnetized or 
constructed of nonmagnetic materials.94 
 
 
Figure 24.   The Visby-Class Corvette95 
 
B. SKJOLD CLASS MISSILE FAST PATROL BOAT (NORWAY) 
The Skjold class (The Norwegian Navy) of missile fast patrol boats is 
characterized by its speed, reduced signatures, small size with heavy weapon load, and its 
littoral combat capability. The Skjold (“Shield”) has an air-cushioned catamaran hull 
(surface effect) which, with waterjet propulsion, provides high speed and 
maneuverability. 
 
                                                 
94 Grahn, 2006. 
95 Jane's Information Group, 2006. 
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The first of class ship, KNM Skjold (P960), was commissioned in April 1999. 
The Norwegian government approved the construction of five more Skjold class vessels 
in June 2002. Contract negotiations were concluded in July 2003. The series of ships will 
be built at the Umoe Mandal shipyard and are planned for delivery from 2006-09. The 
other five hulls will be: Storm (P961), Skudd (P962), Steil (P963), Glimt (P964), and 
Gnist (P965).  
In September 2002, the ship completed a 13-month deployment in the U.S.A., 
which allowed the U.S. Navy to study the Skjold class concept. The ship participated in a 
series of naval exercises and a number of tests with U.S. Navy research establishments 
NAVSEA and the Office of Naval Research. This was the result of a bilateral agreement 
in which the U.S. Navy reviewed the Skjold capabilities and performance as part of their 
transformational activities including Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) development.96 
 
 
Figure 25.   Skjold Class Missile Fast Patrol Boat97 
 
C. FEARLESS CLASS PATROL VESSEL (SINGAPORE) 
Singapore Technologies Marine Ltd (ST Marine), part of Singapore Technologies 
Engineering, built twelve Fearless class patrol vessels for the Republic of Singapore 
                                                 
96 Naval Technology Web Page, 2006. 
97 Jane's Information Group, 2006. 
  72
Navy (RSN). The RSN awarded the contract to ST Marine in February 1993 and the first 
of the Fearless class patrol craft was commissioned in the first quarter of 1996. The final 
vessel of the class was commissioned in May 1999. 
The first six vessels of the class, Fearless (94), Brave (95), Courageous (96), 
Gallant (97), Resilience (98), and Unity (99), are armed for anti-submarine warfare 
missions. The remaining six vessels, Resilience (82), Unity (83), Sovereignty (84), 
Justice (85), Freedom (86) and Independence (87), are general patrol vessels.  
The 55m patrol vessel uses a steel monohull with a round-bilge semi-
displacement hull, and it incorporates very fine V-shaped frames in the forward sections. 
The superstructure is constructed in marine-grade light alloy. The design of the vessel 
allows the layout to be reconfigured to accept a range of sensors and weapons systems to 




Figure 26.   Fearless Class Patrol Vessel99 
                                                 
98 Naval Technology Web Page, 2006. 
99 Jane's Information Group, 2006. 
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D. ROUSSEN CLASS (62 METRE SUPER VITA) FAST ATTACK MISSILE 
CRAFT (GREECE) 
Elefsis Industrial Enterprises SA has been awarded the contract for the supply of 
three Super Vita 62 m fast attack missile craft for the Hellenic (Greece) Navy. The ships, 
called the “Roussen Class,” are being constructed at the Elefsis yard near Athens. Vosper 
Tnornycroft provides design, construction support, ship’s equipment and logistics support 
services to Elefsis. 
The initial requirement is for three fast attack craft, and part of the agreement 
includes provision of two ex-Royal Navy Hunt Class mine countermeasure vessels.  
The fast attack craft has a displacement of 580t fully loaded. The first ship, HS 
Roussen (P67), was launched in November 2002 and was commissioned in December 
2005. The second, HS Daniolis (P68), was launched in July 2003 and will be delivered in 
2006. The third, HS Kristallidis (P69), was launched in April 2004 and is due for delivery 
in November 2006.  
In September 2003, a contract was awarded for a further two ships (HS 
Grigoropoulos and HS Ritsos), to be built by Elefsis and delivered in 2006 and 2007.  
The vessel’s sensor suite includes the Thales MW08 3D G-band surveillance 
radar, Thales Nederland Mirador electro-optical target tracker, an integrated Thales 
Nederland Scout Mark II low probability of intercept radar, and Northrop Grumman 
(formerly Litton) Marine Bridgemaster-E navigation radar.100 
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E. COMPARISON BETWEEN LITTORAL COMBAT ASSETS 
Table 13 shows the comparison between littoral combat assets in specifications 
and operational capabilities. 
 




GD Visby Skjold Fearless Roussen 
Length (m) 115.5 127.1 73 46.8 55 62 
Beam (m) 13.1 30.4 10.4 13.5 8.6 9.5 
Draft (m) 3.7 4.5 2.4 2.3 2.7 2.6 




3000 3000 620 260 500 580 
Complement 65102 65 43 15 32 45 
Capabilities  
ASW Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
ASuW Yes103 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AAW Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MW Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Aviation (inc. 
UAVs) Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Table 13.   Comparison between Littoral Combat Assets in Specifications and 
Operational Capabilities 
                                                 
102 The core crew on the LCS will be about 40 sailors with a detachment for mission modules 
numbering about 15 and an air crew detachment of about 10.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The one who rules the seas, rules the world. 
Barbaros Hayrettin Pasha 
Admiral-in-Chief of the Ottoman Navy (1543–1546) 
 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The littoral environment and the enemy that may be encountered therein impose 
new demands on any naval forces. Naval forces that operate within the littoral 
environment are becoming increasingly vulnerable for the following reasons: 
• geographical constraints 
• limited battlespace 
• reduced reaction time to incoming threats 
• the lethality of enemy weapons 




• restrictive rules of engagement 
• unrealistic and unattainable states of readiness 
• the eventual degradation of weapon and sensor performance  
Though the U.S. Navy conducted a formal requirements process and an analysis 
of other potential solutions, it did so after concluding that the LCS concept was the best 
option to address the challenges of operating U.S. forces in the littorals. Normally, a 
major acquisition program should include an examination of basic requirements and an 
analysis of potential solutions before a new system is decided upon. Based on the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DOD) reviews of the U.S. Navy’s analysis and the revised 
acquisition guidance requirements, the U.S. Navy eventually examined a number of 
alternative solutions to address littoral capability problems, such as the extent to which 
existing fleet assets or joint capabilities could be used. The U.S. Navy still concluded that 
the LCS concept was the best option. However, the U.S. Navy’s analysis of one area of 
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littoral operations—the surface threats facing U.S. forces in littoral waters—did not 
include consideration of the potential impact of all threats the LCS is likely to face. For 
example, while the requirements for the LCS are focused on combating small boats, the 
LCS could face larger threats in littoral waters, including missile-armed warships. 
Though the LCS is to rely on support from other nearby U.S. forces, the U.S. Navy also 
intends for the LCS to operate independently of those forces. The U.S. Navy has not 
analyzed how operating independently could pose additional risks to LCS.104 
The survivability of the LCS in dangerous littoral waters is open to question. 
Speed, stealth, and battlespace awareness may not be sufficient to avoid being targeted 
and attacked by modern sensors and weapons, particularly in waters close to an enemy’s 
shore. Also the LCS’s modest self-defense weapons may not be adequate to counter 
incoming missiles and torpedoes.105 
The requirements the U.S. Navy decided upon for the LCS’s surface warfare 
capabilities were focused on small boats as the adversary, and this did not include an 
analysis of the impact of larger surface threats in the littorals. The U.S. Navy focused 
their analysis of the surface threat on swarms of small boats that are capable of operating 
at high speeds and employing shoulder-mounted or crew-served weapons, such as light 
machine guns. From or near shorelines, these boats can conduct short-range attacks that 
are simultaneous and have the element of surprise. The U.S. Navy measured its current 
and programmed capabilities against defeating swarms of small boats in high numbers. 
For example, to determine the capability problems and measures of effectiveness for 
escorting ships through choke points, the U.S. Navy measured its force structure against 
defeating large numbers of small boats. However, larger threats, such as missile-armed 
patrol boats and frigates, are also identified in the U.S. Navy’s LCS concept of operations 
and threat studies as threats that the LCS may face in the littorals. Such vessels may be 
armed with medium caliber guns, torpedoes, and anti-ship missiles. These threats could 
present additional risks to LCS operations.  
                                                 
104 United States General Accounting Office 2001. 
105 O'Rourke and Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service, 2005. 
  79
U.S. Navy officials stated that if a larger surface threat were encountered, an LCS 
would be able to call upon the assistance of other U.S. forces in the area, such as tactical 
aviation or larger surface warships. In a major combat operation, it is true that LCS 
squadrons would be able to draw upon the assistance of those nearby navy or joint forces 
in the face of a larger surface threat in the area. However, according to the LCS concept 
of operations, in addition to operating with other U.S. forces on a regular basis, the LCS 
is intended to operate independently of those forces, depending on the types and 
circumstances of the missions. When operating independently, such as during routine 
deployments to littoral waters, the LCS may not be able to call upon assistance from 
larger U.S. forces. This may impede LCS operations and may force the LCS to withdraw 
from an operating area. This situation would be contrary to the U.S. Navy’s goals. Since 
the U.S. Navy did not analyze the impact of larger surface threats on LCS operations, the 
extent of the risk and the impact on littoral operations is not known.106 
Those who are skeptical of the LCS program could argue that, although U.S. 
Navy computer simulations and war games may show that a ship like the LCS would 
increase the U.S. Navy’s war fighting effectiveness in the littoral environment, the U.S. 
Navy has not shown that this increase is greater than the increase that might be achieved 
by investing a similar amount of funding in other approaches for performing littoral 
warfare missions. Without thoroughly examining potential alternative approaches, the 
U.S. Navy identified a need for additional littoral war fighting capability and seemingly 
leaped to the conclusion that the LCS would be the best way to provide it. Helicopters, 
frigates, and submarines have performed littoral warfare missions for years, and the U.S. 
Navy has not shown through rigorous analysis why these platforms—or unmanned 
vehicles deployed from manned aircraft, submarines, or larger surface ships operating 
further from shore—would be inferior to the LCS for performing such missions. 
On the other hand, supporters of the LCS could argue that the LCS program 
represents the best possible approach for performing the LCS’s stated missions because 
the LCS program would exploit the new concept of modular payload packages to achieve 
                                                 
106 United States General Accounting Office, 2001. 
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significant mission flexibility. The LCS also has an improved ability to accept upgrades 
and new missions over its life-cycle and would take full advantage of unmanned 
vehicles.107 
Tables 14 and 15 show the comparison between U.S. LCS and the Turkish Navy’s 
surface combatants in specifications and operational capabilities. 








(Type A 69) Tepe 
Length (m) 115.5 127.1 118 138.1 80.5 134 
Beam (m) 13.1 30.4 14.8 13.7 10.3 14.3 
Draft (m) 3.7 4.5 6.4 7.5 5.5 7.8 




3000 3000 3380 3638 1250 4260 
Complement 65108 65 187 206 104 288 
Capabilities  
ASW Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ASuW Yes109 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AAW Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
MW Yes Yes No No No No 
Aviation (inc 
UAVs) Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Table 14.   Comparison between U.S. LCS and the Turkish Navy Frigates in 
Specifications and Operational Capabilities 
                                                 
107 O'Rourke and Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service, 2005. 
108 The core crew on the LCS will be about 40 sailors with a detachment for mission modules 
numbering about 15 and an air crew detachment of about 10. 
109 The LCS will conduct ASuW operations against small surface crafts. The LCS will not carry 
ASCMs. 
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Ruzgar Yildiz Kartal 
Length (m) 115.5 127.1 64.2 58.1 57.3 42.5 
Beam (m) 13.1 30.4 8.3 7.6 7.6 7 
Draft (m) 3.7 4.5 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.4 




3000 3000 550 436 433 190 
Complement 65 65 46 40 45 39 
Capabilities  
ASW Yes Yes No No No No 
ASuW Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AAW Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MW Yes Yes No No No No 
Aviation (inc 
UAVs) Yes Yes No No No No 
Table 15.   Comparison between U.S. LCS and the Turkish Navy Guided Missile-Fast 
Attack Crafts in Specifications and Operational Capabilities 
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations represent the personal opinions of the author and 
are not to be taken as the proven method by which proficiency and synergy of forces is to 
be obtained within the littoral environment. 
The author is making the following recommendations for the Turkish Navy:  
• To wait for the operational test and evaluation results of the LCS and see 
whether it meets the performance requirements mentioned in Chapter IV. 
The U.S. Navy will revise its acquisition strategy to ensure that it has 
sufficiently experimented with both of the Flight 0 ship designs, captured 
lessons learned from Flight 0 operations with more than one of the mission 
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packages, and mitigated operational and technology risks before they 
select a design for the Flight 1 ship or award a contract for the 
construction of the Flight 1 ship. 
• To analyze the cost-effectiveness of the LCS as a focused-mission ship 
employing modular mission payload packages rather than as ship with a 
built-in multi-mission combat system that the Turkish Navy is currently 
using. LCS mission modules would not be changed in open waters; they 
would be changed in a friendly port. If the friendly port is near the LCSs’ 
operating area, then LCSs are not needed in that area. If the friendly port is 
not near the operating area, the LCSs will not be able to change mission 
modules in a timely manner. The storage of the mission modules that are 
not loaded on the LCS could be a problem in the theater of operation. 
• To conduct an analysis of the ability of the LCS program to achieve and 
exploit the concept of network-centric warfare that will be a key 
component of naval transformation. The LCS program will be helpful for 
the evaluation of future littoral combat ship programs such as the MilGem 
(National Vessel) program. 
• To consider other littoral combat assets mentioned in Chapter V. A 
Turkish LCS will fight in the Aegean Sea, a relatively shallow body of 
water with a many surface (such as islands and shoals) and sub-surface 
obstacles and tactically complex water that provides shallow-draft 
warships excellent locations for scouting, attack, and concealment; the 
Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea with dense maritime traffic that can 
challenge the building and maintenance of a operationally useful maritime 
picture and blur the lines between neutral and foe. From the comparison 
between littoral combat assets table (Table 13) stealth, fast, and small 
surface combatant such as Visby class corvette can conduct ASuW 
missions against ASCM-armed warships, MW missions, and ASW 
missions against small diesel submarines in the Turkish Navy’s areas of 
responsibility.   
The author suggests that the key components of naval force transformation for 
littoral operations rest upon new concepts such as the U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship. 
For the Turkish Navy, it is important to apply its littoral combat experience to the LCS 
use in joint operations with other branches of the Turkish Armed Forces. The Turkish 
Navy’s warships, aircraft, and submarines are designed for operations in the littoral 
environment. Also, Turkish Navy personnel are trained for the intricacies of operating in 
the littoral environment. These facts will help to adapt the LCS concept as force 
transformation continues. 
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